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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : Case No. 20050676-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (2002) 
(providing appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases). Appellant 
Edgar Tiedemann requested permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. On 
October 24, 2005, this Court granted the request in an order attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMEN1 OF I HE ISSUES AND S 1AINDAKPS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements obtained in vio-
lation of the state and federal constitutions and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Standard of Review: A bifurcated standard applies to the first issue. This Court 
will review a trial court's tactual findings for clear error, State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 
1186 (Utah 1995), and its legal rulings for correctness. See State v. Rettenbergen 1999 
UT 80,^10, 984 P.2d 1009. 
B. Whether the state's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence in this case 
constitutes a violation of Tiedemann's due process rights. 
Standard of Review: The second issue is a question of law, which this Court will 
review for correctness. | e e e.g. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated 
on other grounds as stated in Campbell v. State Farm, 2001 UT 89, f 13, 65 P.3d 1134. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 246-267; 337-358; and 
638:5-9, 13-19. The second issue was preserved at 388-404; and 638:19-28, 32-34. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant and set forth at Addendum B: U.S. Const, 
amends. V, VI, and XIV,, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
In November 200^, the state charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991), stemming from events that occurred in 
November 1991. (R. 1-5). The defense requested discovery (see R. 24-27), and on 
October 6, 2003, the tria.ll court bound Tiedemann over for trial on the charges. (R. 99). 
On December 6, 21004, Tiedemann filed a motion to suppress statements made 
during a police interrogatjion in November 1991. (R. 246-267; see also 337-358). The 
trial court took the matter under advisement and set the case for an 8-day trial to begin in 
January 2006. (R. 513-14; 581-83). On December 20, 2004, Tiedemann filed a motion to 
dismiss based on the state's destruction of exculpatory evidence in the case in 1993. (R. 
388-404). The trial court took that matter under advisement as well. (R. 513-14). 
On July 22, 2005, Ithe trial court issued a memorandum decision and order denying 
the defendant's request td suppress the interrogation statements (R. 585-595), and on 
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September 27, 2005, the trial court issued a second decision denying the defendant's 
request to dismiss the case due to the destruction of exculpatory evidence. (R. 599-607). 
A copy of the trial court's July 22 order is attached as Addendum C, and a copy of the 
September 27 order is attached as Addendum D. 
Tiedemann filed a timely petition and amended petition from the issuance of each 
interlocutory order (see e.g. R. 598, 608-610; Addendum A, hereto). On October 24, 
2005, this Court granted the petitions for this appeal. (See Addendum A). The trial is 
stayed pending resolution of the issues here. Tiedemann is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder for the deaths of Susan 
Sessions, Charles Timberman, and Scott Bunnell, Jr. (R. 1-5). It alleged that on 
November 1, or November 2, 1991, Tiedemann shot the victims at his trailer home at 
3874 Hummingbird, West Valley City. (Id.) Susan Sessions and Charles Timerberman 
died at the scene; Scott Bunnell died in February 2001. (IdL; R. 438). 
On November 2, 1991, police took Tiedemann into custody and recovered 
evidence from the trailer home, including blood and tissue samples, fingerprints, drugs, 
paraphernalia, and items of clothing and bedding. (See R. 389; 477-78). They also 
recovered weapons, and interrogated Tiedemann for a confession. (See R. 3-4). 
The state originally charged Tiedemann on November 5, 1991, with two counts of 
aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, and one count of aggravated sexual assault (Case No. 911013168). (R. 526-
29; 477; 519). The original trial court ordered competency evaluations. (R. 519). 
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After evaluations, the court found Tiedemann to be incompetent. (R. 519-20; 532). 
His mental illnesses included mild dementia, which was partially "substance-induced, 
and partially due to cerebrovascular trauma in 1988; organic mood disorder [] (depression 
with mood congruent psychotic features); and inhalant dependence." (R. 532). 
Tiedemann also suffered from a neurological disorder due to a brain injury he 
suffered in 1988; he had "difficulty understanding and expressing ideas conveyed through 
verbal language;" and he suffered from a Mixed "Personality Disorder with Paranoid, 
Schizoid and Antisocial features." (R. 532). "The combination of organic brain damage, 
intractable craving for Toluene, and personality disorder [made] it highly unlikely that 
Mr. Tiedemann [would] ever be able to function in a rational legal manner outside a 
supervised residential Hying facility." (R. 532-33). Due to the mental illnesses, "the 
defendant has lost the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to 
cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed." 
(R. 534). Tiedemann also exhibited difficulty concentrating on tasks and understanding 
verbal instructions, and he had difficulty with word retrieval and concentration. (R. 540). 
Tiedemann's long+term clinical prognosis in 1992 was abysmal. (R. 536). His 
condition would "remain! incompetent in the foreseeable future in the absence of more 
vigorous psychopharmacologic treatment of his depression and psychosis." (R. 532). 
Due to the psychological evaluations in 1992, the state determined to dismiss the 
original charges against Tiedemann. It also represented that it would not file charges in 
the future. (R. 477-78; see 558). "As a result, the West Valley City Police Department 
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ultimately destroyed the evidence that was collected at the crime scene." (R. 478 (state's 
pleadings)). A list of destroyed evidence is attached as Addendum E. 
In October 2002, an attorney in Utah County advised the Salt Lake District 
Attorney's office that Tiedemann would be released from the state hospital. (R. 562). 
Apparently the hospital was unable to secure federal aid for Tiedemann's treatment and 
further placement due to his foreign citizenship. (See R. 562; 636:19). 
In November 2002, the state filed the underlying charges here against Tiedemann. 
(R. 1-5; 478; see also 636:19). The state has not disputed in filings with the trial court 
that Tiedemann suffered diminished mental capacity at the time of the police interroga-
tion in November 1991. (See e.g. R. 470). Likewise, the state has not disputed the "defen-
dant's claim of intoxication" at the time of the interview in November 1991. (R. 471). It 
also has not disputed the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. (R. 477-78). 
Additional facts relating to the issues on appeal are set forth below. Tiedemann is 
incarcerated. A trial is stayed pending resolution of the issues in this interlocutory appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officers obtained confessions from Tiedemann during an interrogation. The 
confessions were unlawful in two respects. First, Tiedemann was intoxicated and 
mentally impaired; he disclosed to officers that he did not know if he was capable of 
understanding and answering questions. Also, Tiedemann was deemed to be mentally 
incompetent shortly after the interrogation. Officers disregarded the circumstances, and 
engaged in tactics designed to keep Tiedemann talking in order to obtain a confession. 
The waiver and confessions here were not voluntary and must be suppressed. Second, 
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Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent during questioning. Officers failed to honor 
his request. That violates Miranda. The confessions must be suppressed on that basis. 
Next, if the government destroys potentially exculpatory evidence in a criminal 
prosecution, a federal due process analysis requires the defendant, who is seeking relief, 
to prove that the government acted in bad faith. In this case, state agents knowingly and 
willfully destroyed all physical evidence related to the shootings; their conduct supports 
bad faith. In addition, the evidence was potentially exculpatory. The destruction of 
evidence constitutes a violation of Tiedemann's due process rights under a federal 
analysis. Tiedemann is entitled to relief: the charges must be dismissed. 
In the alternative, this Court may look to article I, section 7 of the state constitu-
tion and adopt a different analysis when police destroy evidence related to a criminal pro-
secution. Specifically, this Court may determine that the defendant is not required to 
prove bad faith. Instead,, this Court may adopt an analysis that considers several factors 
for a remedy, including the state's culpability in destroying the evidence, the significance 
of the evidence, and the prejudice to defendant. Other jurisdictions have adopted such an 
assessment. On that basils, this Court may remand for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. OFFICERS OBTAINED INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS IN 
VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA. 
A. TIEDEMANN DID NOT WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS; AND HE 
SPECIFICALLY INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. 
The federal constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any cri-
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minal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, amend. V; see also Utah Const, 
art. I, § 12. Under the law, a person in custody must be advised, prior to questioning that 
"he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); id. at 444. Also, before a statement may be taken, 
an officer must obtain a clear and unequivocal waiver of these rights from the accused. 
See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997). 
Unless an accused is informed of his rights and he "knowingly and intelligently 
waive[s] these rights and agree[s] to answer questions or make a statement," Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 479, the government may not present the statement in evidence at trial. Id. 
An accused's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights per Miranda is 
assessed under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Norfolk, 381 N.W.2d 120, 
127 (Neb. 1986). An intelligent, voluntary waiver occurs when the defendant possesses 
the capacity to understand the warnings and to act in response to them. See id. at 125. 
Also, voluntariness is met if the officer obtains a waiver without coercion. 
Coercion invalidates the voluntariness of the waiver and/or the confession. Coercion in 
the confession may be established with evidence of the details of the interrogation and/or 
the suspect's condition or circumstances. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^14-15. 
If an officer knows that a defendant is mentally disabled, and nevertheless exploits his 
condition for a waiver or confession, those facts may support coercion. See id. at ^45. 
This Court has ruled that the government has "a heavy burden" to establish that a 
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defendant waived his Miranda rights before questioning. See Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743. 
Also, the government must establish the voluntariness of a confession. Rettenberger, 
1999UT80atU45. 
Once the government has established an initial waiver, the suspect then bears the 
burden to establish that a subsequent invocation of rights was clear and unequivocal. See 
Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935 n.4 (Utah 1998); Davis v. U.S., 
512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). n[T]he suspect 'must articulate his desire to have counsel 
present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.'" Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743 (citing 
Davis, 512 U.S. 459). 
If a suspect later invokes his rights, officers are required to "scrupulously honor[]" 
the request. Michigan v, Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
If the individual ihdicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this 
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any 
statement taken after the person invokes this privilege cannot be other than the 
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (note omitted). 
In this case, the officers violated Tiedemann's right not to incriminate himself in at 
least two respects. First,, Tiedemann was incapable of making a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his rights per Miranda. When the interrogation began, Tiedemann disclosed 
that he was intoxicated ahd he did not know if he was capable of answering questions. 
Officers were aware of the circumstances and disregarded them in pursuit of obtaining a 
confession. That rendersithe interrogation illegal. (See infra, Point I.B.(l), herein). 
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Second, Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent during questioning and the officers 
failed to stop the interrogation. Those circumstances render the confessions unlawful. 
(See infra, Point LB.(2), herein). Each matter is addressed in turn below. 
B. THE TOTAL CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SUPPORT AN ILLEGAL 
INTERROGATION. 
In this case, officers interrogated Tiedemann at the police station on the day of the 
shootings. The interrogation was videotaped and transcribed in part. The transcript is 
attached as Addendum F; the video is included in the record. (R. 611). 
The interrogation started at 1:58 p.m. with Detective Ron Edwards and Sergeant 
Ed Spann. Edwards explained that Tiedemann signed a paper, which gave officers 
permission to search his home (see R. 611, video at 1:58 and transcript at 3 (stating 
Tiedemann signed a waiver for his home)). Also, Edwards explained that Tiedemann 
waived his rights per Miranda and was not intoxicated. (See R. 611, video at 1:58 to 
2:01). Tiedemann corrected Edwards, stating he was intoxicated on Toluene. (Id.) 
Edwards asked how long Tiedemann had been on Toluene, and he responded, "since 
1962." (Id.) His substance abuse was long-term. 
Edwards asked whether Tiedemann was incapable of answering questions. He re-
sponded, "Sometimes. I don't know." (Id.) This part of the interrogation is not included 
in the transcript. (Compare R. 611, video; with transcript); Addendum F, hereto. 
After Tiedemann notified the officers of his impaired state, and after they 
observed his condition, the video stopped and started again 12 minutes later at 2:13 (see 
R. 611, video). The interrogation began a second time at 2:15. (Id.) 
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With the second interrogation, Edwards recited Miranda warnings. (See R. 611, 
video and transcript at page 1). He made no mention of the consent form that Tiedemann 
apparently signed for his home. (Id.) Also, he and Spann asked if Tiedemann understood 
his rights and if he "still wish[ed] to speak to [them] at this time." (See R. 611, video 
and transcript at 1). Tiedemann answered, "Ya," to both questions. (See R. 611, video 
and transcript at 1). Hisicondition on the video tape appeared subnormal: he was sagging 
with his head down, andp generally out of it. (R. 611, video). 
Edwards then asl^ ed Tiedemann, "Are you intoxicated" (id.), even though he could 
observe Tiedemann's condition and had already established that fact in the first part of the 
interrogation. (See R. 611, video from 1:58 to 2:01). Tiedemann again responded in the 
affirmative. He stated he was on Toluene. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 1). This 
time Edwards did not stop the interrogation. Instead, he brushed the information aside 
and moved on to discuss] the shootings at Tiedemann's address, as follows: 
RE [Ron Edwards]: Are you intoxicated? 
ET [Edgar Tiedemann]: On toluene. 
RE: What's toluene? 
ET: Toluene. It's, it's a paint thinner. 
RE: It's a paint thinner? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What are we (going to talk to you about? 
ET: The murders out there. 
RE: What murders? 
ET: The murders out there at West Valley. 
RE: Who are they? 
ET: Suzie, Chuck and Scotty. 
RE: Whose [sic] Suzie? 
ET: She's the woman I love. 
10 
(R. 611, video). At this point, Tiedemann began to cry. 
RE: That you love? 
ET:Ya. 
RE: What happened to her? 
[Silence]. 
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann then informed officers, "I don't want to talk about it." 
(See R. 611, video and transcript at 2). The officers did not discontinue the interrogation. 
They continued questioning: 
ET: / don't want to talk about it. 




ES [Ed Spann]: What don't you want to talk about? 
ET: 1 love that woman so much. 
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about? 
[Silence]. 
ES: You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley? 
ET: . . . inaudible . . . Hummingbird Street. 
ES: I'm sorry, where? 
ET: 1308 [sic] Hummingbird Street. 
ES: 1308 Hummingbird, who lives there? 
ET: Me. 
RE: Who lives with you? 
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in today or last night, I don't know. 




RE: What don't you want to talk about, Ed? 
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann did not respond. He cried as Spann stated the following: 
ES: Edgar, we 're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We 're asking 
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer this question, not 
answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You don't 
have to answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at anytime. 
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(R. 611, video and transcript at 2 (emphasis added)). Tiedemann said, "Okay." (R. 611, 
video). The officers continued: 
ES: He made that clear to you, right? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what part 
don't you want to talk to us about? 
[Silence] 
RE: Edgar do you remember me reading your rights earlier and you signing a 
waiver lor us to starch your home? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen 
some people. Who shot them? 
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann confessed to the shootings. As officers continued to 
interrogate him, he began to repeatedly state, "I don't know." (See R. 611, video and 
transcript at 4). Edwards then questioned Tiedemann further about his intoxication. 
RE: How long have you been sniffing that solvent? 
ET: Since 1962. 
RE: Tonight how Hong? Or today? 
ET: All day. 
RE: Do you know what today's date is? 
ET: You told me but I don't remember. 
RE: Do you know what day of the week it is? 
ET: No. 
RE: What was yesterday? 
ET: 1 don't have &ny idea. 
(See R. 61 K video and transcript at 4). 
Officers then asked Tiedemann about employment; they continued to question him 
about the shootings and obtained additional confessions from him; and they asked 
questions about Tiedemann's history. (R. 611, video and transcript at 4-33). As they 
asked again about Scott Punnell, Susan Sessions, Charles Timberman, and events leading 
up to and shortly after thp shootings, they increased the pace of the interrogation. (See R. 
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611, video and transcript at 5). 
Officers also asked if Tiedemann had "mental problems." He told them he had 
"all kinds." He told them he thinks he is "Adolf Hitler." (See R. 611, video and transcript 
at 9). Edwards asked if Tiedemann heard voices, and he asked, "Who was telling you to 
go shoot them?" Tiedemann answered, "The devil." (See R. 611, video and transcript at 
13-14). Tiedemann appeared intoxicated, exhausted, disoriented or confused, and out of it 
with head lowered, sometimes crying. 
Near the conclusion of the interrogation, officers asked Tiedemann to affirm that 
he made incriminating statements of his own tree will. The recording reflects the 
following: Tiedemann stated that Susan Sessions and her sister Deborah used heroin the 
night of the shooting. Spann asked where: 
ES: They were doing heroin before they got to your house? 
ET:Yeah. 
RE: Who with? 
ET: 1 don't know. 
RE: With him? 
ET: 1 don't know. 
RE: Is Debbie a prostitute, too? 
ET: I think so. 
ES: So you asked Suzie to sleep with you and she called you disgusting? 
ET: Ya, 1 guess so. 
ES: Well no, it is true or not? 
ET: 1 thinks it is. 




RE: Why did you shoot them? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then? 
ET: I don't know. I just, I don't know. 
RE: Have we made any threats to you during this interview? 
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ET.No. 
RE: Have we promised you anything? 
ET:No. 
RE: Are you making this statement on your own free will? 
ET: Ya. 
(See R. 611, video and transcript at 33-34). Tiedemann stated he wanted to be "put to 
death by lethal injection!1' he acknowledged he would be charged with capital homicide 
and he reiterated to officers that he was under the influence of Toluene. (See R. 611, 
video and transcript at 35). Edwards then asked, "How do you feel?" Tiedemann 
answered, "Lousy." He also stated that he "sometimes" understood what the officers 
said. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 35). The interrogation concluded at 3:00 p.m. 
In trial court proceedings, the defense asked the court to suppress the confessions 
where the waiver and confessions were involuntary. (R. 339-58). Also, the defense 
argued that when Tiedemann invoked his right to silence shortly after the interrogation 
began, the officers failed to scrupulously honor the request. (Id.) In a memorandum 
decision dated July 22, 2005, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. (R. 585-595). 
With respect to the voluntariness of Tiedemann's waiver and confessions, the court 
stated that the officers did not use false statements or half-truths; they did not use the 
false-friend technique; they did not use threats or promises; the interrogation took place 
in an hour; and the officers did not deny "special requests of the defendant. There is no 
evidence of any ethical iliisconduct by the police." (R. 591). The court considered there 
to be no coercion. (R. 591-92). 
Also, the court referenced Tiedemann's diminished mental capacity, that he was 
under the influence of Toluene, and he suffered other mental impairments. (See R. 592). 
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However, the court was not compelled by those facts and determined that the factors 
relevant to lack of voluntariness were not present in the instant case. (R. 593). It stated, 
"Prior to his interrogation, defendant had not been found incompetent or 'insane,' and 
similar coercive factors were absent." (R. 593-94). 
With respect to whether Tiedemann invoked his Miranda rights during the interro-
gation, the court determined that after Tiedemann advised officers that he "did not want 
to talk about it," officers asked further questions that Tiedemann answered. (See R. 590). 
Based on that, the court should have ruled that officers failed to honor Tiedemann's re-
quest. Instead, it ruled that Tiedemann did not invoke his rights during questioning. (Id.) 
The trial court's rulings are in error. Tiedemann requests that this Court reverse 
the rulings since the confessions were illegally obtained. (See infra, Point I.B.(l) & (2)). 
The trial court here did not observe witnesses as they testified, and it was not re-
quired to make credibility determinations concerning witnesses and their testimony. (See 
R. 638). The trial court reviewed the interrogation and had filings from 1991 and 1992. 
Those filings are available to this Court for review. (See R. 611; 530-53 (expert reports)). 
(1) The Waiver and Confessions Lacked Voluntariness. 
Under the law, the state must establish the voluntariness of a waiver and confes-
sion under the totality of the circumstances. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^14-15, 
45; State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-26 (Utah 1989). The state must prove that the 
suspect's waiver was clear, unequivocal, knowing and intelligent. See Leyva, 951 P.2d 
at 743. Also, the confession must be voluntary. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^ [45. 
Utah courts look to both the tactics of the officers and the characteristics of the 
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accused in considering voluntariness. See Strain, 779 P.2d at 225-26. For example, if 
officers use abusive physical tactics, that supports coercion. See Beecher v. Alabama, 
389 U.S. 35 (1967) (offilbers held a gun to the suspect's head). Likewise, if officers 
exploit a suspect's vulnerabilities or are insensitive to special circumstances, that supports 
coercion. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^26 (recognizing that techniques that 
bear no resemblance to Abusive coercion may nevertheless be coercive, depending on the 
suspect's circumstances)!. 
The voluntariness assessment considers the suspect's perceptions and 
understanding, and it includes objective factors such as the age, maturity, intelligence, 
schooling, mental condition, and intoxication of the suspect. See e.g. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1986); State v. Williams, 295 S.E.2d 493, 498 (N.C. 
App. 1982); Henry v. D^es, 658 F.2d 406, 409 & 411 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Courts have found involuntary waivers and confessions where officers exploited 
or disregarded a suspect's deficiencies, vulnerabilities, or impairments to pursue a 
confession. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at [^45 (stating that defendant's confession was 
involuntary to the extent his will, "already vulnerable due to certain known mental 
disabilities and deficiencies, was overborne by the suggestive and coercive techniques" of 
interrogators); Russell vff State, 460 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind. App. 1984) (defendant was a 
patient in a mental institution); Henry, 658 F.2d at 408 & 411; State v. Graham, 642 
S.W.2d 880 (Ark. 1982)1; see also State v. Clark, 460 A.2d 449 (Vt. 1983) (recognizing 
that the government muit establish a proper waiver where defendant's mental capacity 
may be affected by intoxication); People v. Washington, 486 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662-63 (N.Y. 
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Sup. 1985) ("The court finds that defendant's intoxication seriously impaired his ability to 
understand the nature of his waiver and the results that would flow from it"). 
In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, the United States Supreme Court 
considered an officer's obligations during interrogation when faced with a mentally-
disturbed suspect. In that case, the defendant approached an officer and told him that he 
wanted to confess to a murder. Id. at 160. The officer was bewildered. He provided 
Miranda warnings, and the defendant insisted that he understood his rights and wanted to 
talk. Id. at 160. Connelly confessed to the murder of a woman. Id. 
The officer later learned that the defendant was psychotic. Id. at 161. However, 
he was unaware at the time of the confession of defendant's mental impairment. Id. 
Under the circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to find that the officer 
engaged in coercive conduct. The Court ruled that "[a]bsent police conduct causally 
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has 
deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." kf at 164 (footnote omitted). 
The Court nevertheless recognized that a confession may be coerced where an 
officer knows of a suspect's deficiencies at the time of questioning and exploits the 
circumstances. See id. at 164-65 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08 
(1960); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1963)). 
In another case, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, the defendant was charged 
in 1948 with robbery. At the time of the offense, he already had suffered "a lengthy siege 
of mental illness." kf at 200. 
He had served in the armed forces during World War II, but had been discharged 
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in 1944 as permanently disabled by a psychosis. He was thereupon placed in an 
institution and given medical treatment over extended periods until February 14, 
1948, when he wjks released from a Veterans Administration hospital for a ten-day 
leave in the care of his sister. He failed to return to the hospital and consequently 
was discharged on May 24, 1948. The robbery of which he stands convicted 
occurred during this period of unauthorized absence from a mental ward. 
Blackburn's medical records further disclose that from 1946 he was classified by 
the Veterans Administration as 100 percent "incompetent" and that at the time of 
his discharge from the hospital both his diagnosis of "schizophrenic reaction, 
paranoid type" and his characterization as "incompetent" remained unchanged. 
Id. at 200-01. Shortly after the offense, Blackburn confessed. Id, During the interroga-
tion, he answered questions "like any normal person." Id, at 204. "The Chief Deputy 
conceded that Blackburn said he had been a patient in a mental institution, but claimed 
that Blackburn also statdd he had been released, and avowed that Blackburn 'talked sen-
sible and give (sic) sensible answers,' was clear-eyed, and did not appear nervous." Id. 
After the arrest, the judge had the defendant examined by three physicians, and 
concluded that he was insane "either at the time of the commission of (the) offense or at 
the present time." Id. at 201. The judge committed Blackburn to the state hospital where 
he remained for more than four years for treatment. Id, at 201-02. When Blackburn was 
deemed competent, his case went to trial. Id, There he maintained his insanity; he 
claimed he could not remember the crime, his arrest, his confession, his commitment to 
the hospital or his treatment; and he denied the truth of his confession. Id, at 202. 
When the prosecutor sought to admit the confession into evidence, the defense 
objected and referenced the physicians' reports and records from the competency 
hearings. IcL The prosecutor countered the reports with evidence of an additional 
physician. Dr. Richards,, who was a staff member at the state hospital. Id. at 203. The 
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doctor's answers were in harmony with other reports regarding the finding that Blackburn 
had been insane. Id. However, during "cross-interrogatories," 
[the doctor] executed an astonishing about-face by opining that Blackburn had 
been "normal" since he first saw him, that his mental condition was "normal" on 
the date of the crime and "good" on the date of the confession, and that he had 
never seen Blackburn suffer "psychotic episodes." Even this portion of the 
deposition is not without incongruity, however, for Dr. Richards' response to one 
cross-interrogatory was that he did not believe Blackburn had experienced lucid 
intervals. 
Id. at 203-04. The parties also presented evidence concerning the circumstances of the 
interrogation, where it lasted 8 or 9 hours with a one-hour break for dinner. Id. 
The trial court admitted the confession into evidence. Id at 205. The jury con-
victed the defendant of the offense and the state appellate court affirmed. On review to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, it reversed the conviction. Id. The Court looked to the circum-
stances of the interrogation, id at 207-08 (acknowledging the length of the interrogation 
in a tiny room filled with officers and without friends, relatives, or legal counsel for the 
defendant), and it considered the defendant's mental condition. It determined that the 
circumstances supported "the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and 
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed." Id at 207. It stated the following: 
[C Joercion can be mental as well as physical[. T]he blood of the accused is not 
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. A number of cases have 
demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, that the efficiency of the rack and the 
thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated 
modes of "persuasion." A prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant 
of his rights and who has been cut off from the moral support of friends and rela-
tives is not infrequently an effective technique of terror. Thus the range of inquiry 
in this type of case must be broad, and this Court has insisted that the judgment in 
each instance be based upon consideration of "the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. at 206 (note and cite omitted). 
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It also recognized the following: 
It is, of course, quite true that we are dealing here with probabilities. It is possible, 
for example, that Blackburn confessed during a period of complete mental 
competence. Moreover, these probabilities are gauged in this instance primarily 
by the opinion evidence of medical experts. But this case is novel only in the 
sense that the evidence of insanity here is compelling, for this Court has in the past 
reversed convictions where psychiatric evidence revealed that the person who had 
confessed was 'OF low mentality, if not mentally ill,1 Fikes v. State of Alabama, 
supra, at page 196, 77 S.Ct. at page 284, 1 L.Ed.2d 246, or had a 'history of 
emotional instability,' Spano v. People of State of New York, supra, 360 U.S. at 
page 322, 79 S.Ct. at page 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. And although facts such as 
youth and lack ol education are more easily ascertained than the imbalance of a 
human mind, we cannot say that this has any appreciable bearing upon the 
difficulty of the ultimate judgment as to the effect these various circumstances 
have upon independence of will, a judgment which must by its nature always be 
one of probabilities. 
Id. at 208 (note omitted), The confession was deemed to be involuntary and 
inadmissible. Id. at 210. 
The lessons of th# above cases apply here. 
In this case, officers were advised of and observed Tiedemann's intoxicated and 
mental condition at the beginning of and during the interrogation. (See R. 611, video). 
Notwithstanding, they proceeded with questioning for a confession, disrespecting his 
requests to not talk about the shootings; moving forward with the interrogation while 
Tiedemann cried; persisting with repeated questions at times; accelerating the pace or 
trading off with questions. (Id.) Their tactics were intended to keep Tiedemann talking 
in order to obtain a confession. The totality of the circumstances here fails to support 
voluntariness. Thus, the interrogation was unlawful. 
Turning first to the trial court ruling, the court stated the following: 
Here, the interrogators did not make use of false statements or half-truths. They 
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did not use the false friend technique by implying they were acting in the best 
interest of the defendant by the simple use of his first name. The detectives did 
not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a confession. The 
entire interrogation took place within one hour, and during the investigation, the 
interrogators did not deny any special requests of the defendant. There is no 
evidence of any ethical misconduct by the police. In short, the record shows that 
the detectives' interrogation was absent any suggestive and coercive techniques. 
(R. 591-92). With respect to Tiedemann's condition, the trial court stated, 
The defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, the stroke he suffered in 1982, or a 
head injury received as a child might be the cause of his generalized cerebral 
damage resulting in severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q. 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.) The 
defendant's reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he knows 
Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he is Hitler. His reference 
to Satan telling him to commit the criminal act may also stem from his religious 
beliefs. "A perception of coercion flowing from the 'voice of God' is a matter to 
which the Federal Constitution does not speak." 
(R. 592-93). The court also stated that prior to the interrogation Tiedemann had not been 
found to be incompetent "and similar coercive factors were absent." (R. 593-94). 
The trial court's discussion of the interrogation in this case failed to consider 
several relevant circumstances. See Rettenberger, 1999 U T 80 at Tfl9 (stating that the 
trial court failed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" in its analysis). 
Specifically, the interrogation took place at police headquarters in an interrogation 
room. Tiedemann did not have the support of relatives or legal counsel, although he was 
being interrogated for aggravated and capital offenses. (See R. 611, video and transcript). 
The trial court's analysis made no mention of those circumstances. (R. 591-94). 
In the initial moments of the interrogation, the officers represented in the tape 
recording that they gave Miranda warnings to Tiedemann, he waived the warnings, and 
he was not intoxicated. Tiedemann corrected the officers. (R. 611, video at 1:58 to 
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2:01). He advised that he was intoxicated on Toluene and had abused the substance since 
1962. When officers asked if Tiedemann were incapable of answering questions, 
Tiedemann responded affirmatively. He stated, "Sometimes. I don't know." (R. 611, 
video at 1:58 to 2:01). 
That exchange cannot be construed to support that Tiedemann provided a knowing 
and voluntary waiver, lhdeed, the officers recognized problems with continuing and they 
stopped the interrogation. (R. 611, video at 2:01). When the officers began the recording 
again 12 minutes later, eiven though they had been advised that Tiedemann was intoxi-
cated and incapable of understanding and answering questions, they made no attempt to 
resolve the matter. But $ee Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743-44 (recognizing that the state must 
establish that the suspect understood, and clearly and unequivocally waived his rights per 
Miranda; M[i]f the suspect responds ambiguously or equivocally," the officer must focus 
on clarifying the suspect's intent and understanding). Instead, they avoided the subject 
entirely to proceed with an interrogation. (See R. 611, video and transcript). The trial 
court's analysis failed toltake those circumstances into consideration in assessing the 
voluntariness of the waiter and confessions. (See R. 591-94). 
In the second attempt at the interrogation, officers provided the warnings, asked if 
Tiedemann "wish[ed] to speak" to them, and asked if Tiedemann were intoxicated. (R. 
611, video and transcript at 1). Tiedemann again disclosed his intoxicated condition. 
(Id.) Officers would have observed that Tiedemann's demeanor was subnormal. He was 
slumped down with his head lowered; at times during the interrogation he cried, and/or 
he appeared confused and exhausted and was unable to answer questions (R. 611, video). 
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Officers brushed aside Tiedemann's obvious impairments and inebriated condition to 
proceed with questioning for a confession. (Id.) 
Also, officers persisted with questions even after Tiedemann invoked his right to 
remain silent shortly into the interrogation (infra Point I.B.(2); R. 611, video and 
transcript at 2-3). Indeed, in an effort to get Tiedemann talking, they represented that he 
could answer some questions and not others. (R. 611, video and transcript at 3). That 
was misleading. It docs not adequately reflect Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 
(stating a suspect has the right to remain silent); Mosely, 423 U.S. at 101, 103-04 (stating 
an invocation of the right to remain silent must be honored); (infra, Point LB.(2)). The 
tactic was intended to overcome Tiedemann's will so that he would continue talking. See 
Reltenberger, 1999 UT 80 at |^20 (recognizing that police misrepresentations designed to 
overcome a defendant's will render a confession involuntary). That was improper. 
The officers persisted with questioning for an hour, at times trading off or 
increasing the pace to keep it moving. (R. 611, video and see e.g. transcript at 3, 5-6, 7-
8). They were steadfast and determined. Their tactics were designed to exploit 
Tiedemann's impaired condition, to keep him talking even after he had expressed that he 
did not want to talk about the shootings (see id.; infra, Point LB.(2)), and to take 
advantage of the circumstances to extract a confession. That constitutes misconduct. See 
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at }^45 (ruling that the officers' various tactics were used to 
exploit defendant's deficiencies, rendering the defendant's statements involuntary). The 
trial court did not adequately consider the circumstances in its analysis. (R. 591-94). 
The trial court's analysis failed to consider what the officers observed and knew 
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about Tiedemann's condition when they engaged in an interrogation for a confession. 
(See R. 591 -94). It failed to properly consider that Tiedemann had disclosed to officers 
his inability to understand and answer questions, his intoxicated state, and his mental 
condition. (See R. 591-94; R. 611, video). It also failed to take into consideration that 
officers would have observed Tiedemann's deficiencies, and they nevertheless exploited 
them for the waiver and confessions. (See R. 591-94; R. 611, video). 
Next, the circumstances support "the strongest probability that [defendant was] 
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed." Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207. Shortly 
after the interrogation, Tiedemann was declared incompetent. (See R. 532, 534). 
Physicians described Tiedemann as "alert, but distractible. He alternated between 
attention to task to a somewhat vacant stare. His verbal response time was delayed and it 
was clear that his comprehension for complex questions or directions was impaired." (R. 
534). "He demonstrate^] significant impairment in judgment, attention and concen-
tration, and a mild deficit of immediate memory." (Id.) Also, there was "significant 
impairment of his ability to understand and follow simple commands." (Id.) He 
exhibited difficulty concentrating on tasks and understanding verbal instructions. 
"[Instructions had to be repeated and explained several times " (R. 540). 
He was "only partially able to cooperate" with experts (R. 535). Also, his Toluene 
addiction resulted in "repetitive episodes of acute delirium." (R. 534). 
While experts were not required to assess Tiedemann's mental state on the day of 
the interrogation, their findings after working with him from November 1991 to January 
1992, were undisputed qnd the prognosis was hopeless and grim. (R. 537, 545, 552-53). 
24 
There is nothing in this record to suggest that an assessment of Tiedemann's 
mental condition and intoxication for the date of interrogation would have been more 
optimistic and uplifting. (See R. 531-53). Indeed, since the experts' reports came after 
Tiedemann spent months living in a controlled environment with treatment and without 
access to Toluene, it is improbable to believe anything but that Tiedemann's condition at 
the time of interrogation was incompetent and mentally ill. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 
201, 207 (considering experts' reports to support the strongest possibility that defendant 
was incompetent at the time of the confession). 
Tiedemann ultimately was committed to the Utah State Hospital in 1992, where he 
was medicated and treated for 10 years. Experts opined that given the nature of the brain 
damage in early 1992, he may not be rehabilitated. (R. 536-37, 545). 
In this case, the trial court disregarded those circumstances in its analysis. Yet they 
are relevant. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 202, 207-08 (considering reports from trial 
competency proceedings); Washington, 486 N.Y.S.2d 660 (considering intoxication). 
The trial court here recognized that Tiedemann suffered "generalized cerebral 
damage resulting in severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q." that may 
be due to drug use, and/or a stroke or head injury (R. 592); it recognized instability 
during the interrogation where Tiedemann at times provided detailed answers, but at 
other times did not provide clear answers (R. 586, 593); and it considered Tiedemann's 
references to Hitler and the devil.1 (R. 592-94). Those facts together with the total 
The trial court was not persuaded by Tiedemann's reference to Hitler. However, it 
believed that Tiedemann's reference to Satan may be real and may stem from religious 
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circumstances surrounding Tiedemann's condition "indisputably establish^] the strongest 
probability" that defendant was incompetent "at the time he allegedly confessed." 
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207. 
Here, Tiedemann advised officers of his condition; they were aware that he was 
incapable of understanding and responding to their questions, and the officers observed 
Tiedemann's demeanor during the interrogation. (R. 611, video and transcript). To the 
extent the officers may have considered it possible that—notwithstanding the signs of 
impairment—Tiedemanp was competent when they proceeded with the interrogation (but 
see R. 61 1, video), they cannot be excused for ignoring his disclosures and their 
observations when incompetence, in fact, ultimately was established. (See e.g. R. 532). 
Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is 
affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a 
statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty be 
articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational 
choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law 
enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion. 
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 307. 
"[A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, 
courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the 
'voluntariness' calculus.'1 Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at [^15 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 
164). Thus, under the totality of circumstances analysis, the trial court was required to 
consider the factors relevant to the defendant's mental condition. Also, it was required to 
beliefs. (R. 592). It then discounted that reference on the basis that the federal 
constitution does not protect against coercion flowing "from the 'voice of God.'" (Id.) 
Significantly, Tiedemann did not claim in this case that such a voice coerced him into 
confessing; his claims of coercion related specifically to the officers' conduct. 
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consider that officers were informed and aware of the defendant's vulnerabilities, and 
they exploited them with subtle techniques. See e.g. id. at ^15-16. 
The trial court here "erred in failing to conduct a 'totality of circumstances' 
examination of [defendant's] confession to determine whether the interrogators exploited 
[his] disabilities and deficiencies in such a way that his 'will was overborne.'" 
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at [^19 (cite omitted). 
Officers were informed from the beginning that Tiedemann would not be able to 
understand and answer questions, and they were advised of his long-term substance abuse 
and intoxication. (R. 611, video at 1:58 to 2:01). They made no effort to resolve those 
matters or his inability to understand and answer questions for a clear, unequivocal, 
voluntary waiver and confession. Instead they proceeded with questioning. (R. 611, 
video). That constitutes coercion. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at TJ25 (stating that 
evidence must reveal some physical or psychological force or manipulation designed to 
induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so) (cite omitted). The 
trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
(2) Tiedemann Unequivocally Invoked the Right to Remain Silent During the 
Interrogation. 
If a suspect initially waives his rights per Miranda, he may indicate "in any man-
ner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, [and] the 
interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981) (statement that defendant "want[ed] an attorney before making 
a deal" was sufficient to warrant termination of interrogation); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
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91, 93, 96-97 (1984) (defendant's statement, "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do that," in response to 
the officer's advice that defendant could have cittorney present constituted invocation of 
Miranda rights requiring cessation of questioning); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 
1993) ("Edwards dealt with a clear, unequivocal request for counsel"), disavowed on 
other grounds, State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). 
In Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, the defendant was interrogated on two occasions. Both 
times he waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 479. At the conclusion of the first interroga-
tion, defendant stated he wanted to "make a deal" with officers. Id. When he was told 
officers had no authority to negotiate, he initiated a call, hung up after a moment, then 
stated "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id, Questioning ceased until the next 
day when officers interrogated him a second time. Id The Arizona court ruled that 
defendant waived his rights per Miranda. Id. at 479-80. The Supreme Court reversed. 
The reference to an attorney in Edwards for the purpose of "making a deal" was 
sufficiently unequivocal to warrant suppression of the statements. Id 
In Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), officers arrested the defendant 
Mosely in connection with a series of robberies and took him to headquarters for ques-
tioning. The defendant signed a Miranda form. Id. at 97. Detective Cowley began 
questioning, then defendant invoked his right to remain silent. IcL He stated that he did 
not want to answer questions about the robberies. Id. at 97. Cowley ceased the 
interrogation and took Mosely to a holding cell. Id. 
Cowley then arranged for a second officer, Sergeant Hill, to interrogate Mosely 
two hours later about an unrelated homicide. Id at 98. Cowley did not tell Hill about 
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Mosely's invocation of the right to remain silent. Hill began the interrogation by advising 
Mosely of his rights. "Mosley read the notification form both silently and aloud, and 
Detective Hill then read and explained the warnings to him and had him sign the form." 
Id. at 98. Mosely then implicated himself in the homicide. Id. He ultimately was 
convicted of murder and appealed, challenging the confession. Id. at 99. 
In reviewing the matter, the United States Supreme Court recognized that if a sus-
pect indicates during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, his request must be 
scrupulously honored, and the interrogation must stop. "At this point he has shown that 
he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the 
person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or 
otherwise." Id at 100 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74). 
However, the questioning may continue, as it did in Mosely's case, after a reason-
able hiatus and readmonition of Miranda rights. The Court found that the second interro-
gation there was lawful where there was a sufficient break in circumstances to separate 
the first interrogation from the second. Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-05. Specifically, Cowley 
immediately stopped the first interrogation when defendant invoked the right to remain 
silent; he did not attempt to persuade Mosely to reconsider his decision; the second or 
subsequent interrogation occurred after a "significant period of time" had elapsed (i.e., 
two hours); the subsequent interrogation was conducted by a different officer, Hill, who 
was not involved in the first interrogation; the subsequent interrogation concerned 
different charges; and Hill began the later interrogation with a clear and express recitation 
of the rights per Miranda and a waiver by the defendant. Id. 
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Applying the relevant principles here, Tiedemann unequivocally invoked the right 
to remain silent. (R. 611, video and transcript at 2). 
During questioning Tiedemann clearly stated to officers, "I don't want to talk 
about it." (R. 61 1, video and transcript at 2). That constituted an unequivocal invocation 
of his rights per Miranda. See e.g. Mosdy, 423 U.S. at 97 (when defendant stated that he 
did not want to talk about the robberies, the officer ceased the interrogation); Emspak v. 
U.S., 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (stating that a suspect is not required to use a ritualistic 
formula or talismanic phrase to invoke his rights); see also State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 
265, 266, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (defendant told police he had nothing to say; police failed to 
scrupulously honor invocation), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992); Christopher v. Fla., 
824 F.2d 836, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant's statement, "I got nothing else to say," 
constituted invocation), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1077 (1988). 
Notwithstanding the invocation, the officers here did not scrupulously honor the 
request. They continued questioning. (R. 611, video and transcript at 2-3). The trial 
court characterized the continued questioning as follows: 
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the defendant said, "I 
don't want to talk about it." Immediately afterward, when asked, "What don't you 
want to talk about?" he remained silent. Immediately thereafter, when asked, 
"Who is Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love." The 
defendant readily answered other questions throughout the interrogation, except 
when asked, "What happened to Suzie?" 
(R. 586 (emphasis added); see also 590). The trial court considered the continued 
questioning to be appropriate. (R. 586; 590). It refused to suppress the confessions that 
followed. That was error. The trial court misconstrued the interrogation, and it 
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misapplied the law in this case. 
To start with the interrogation, the video shows that Edwards asked if Tiedemann 
knew why he and Spann were talking to him. Tiedemann answered affirmatively. 
Edwards then asked M[w]hat are we going to talk to you about?" Tiedemann answered, 
"[t]he murders out there" in West Valley. Edwards then asked "Who are they?" 
Tiedemann answered, "Suzie, Chuck, and Scotty." The video recording continued as 
follows: 
RE [Edwards]: Whose [sic] Suzie? 
ET [Tiedemann, crying]: She's the woman I love." 
RE: That you love? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What happened to her? 
[Silence]. 
ET: / don ft want to talk about it. 




ES: What don't you want to talk about? 
ET: / love that woman so much. 
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about! 
[Silence]. 
ES: You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley? 
ET: . . . inaudible . . . Hummingbird Street. 
ES: I'm sorry, where? 
ET: 1308 [sic] Hummingbird Street. 
ES: 1308 Hummingbird, who lives there? 
ET: Me. 
RE: Who lives with you? 
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in today or last night, I don't know. 




RE: What don't you want to talk about, Ed? 
[Silence, Tiedemann crying]. 
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ES: Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're asking 
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer this question, not 
answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You don't 
have to answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at any time, 
ET: Okay. 
ES: He made that clear to you, right? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what part 
don't you want to talk to us about? 
[Silence] 
RE: Edgar, do you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you signing a 
waiver for us to search your home? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen 
some people. Who shot them? 
ET: Me. 
RE: You did? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Why did you shoot them? 
ET: I shot Suzie cause I love her and I shot the other two. 
(R. 611, video and transcript at 2-3). 
After Tiedemann's invocation and then the confirmation (ET: "I don't want to talk 
about it." RE: "You don't want to talk about it?" ET: "No"), officers were required under 
the law to cease the interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Continued questioning was 
inappropriate. Statements obtained thereafter "cannot be other than the product of 
compulsion, subtle or otherwise." Id; Mayes v. State, 571 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ark. 1978) 
(defendant expressed that he did not want to talk to the officer; continued questioning 
constituted a clear violation of Miranda); see also U.S. v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 
1368 (5th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1975); Smith, 469 U.S. 
at 100 (post-request responses may not be used to cast doubt on a defendant who invokes 
his Miranda rights). 
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Instead of honoring Tiedemann's request, the officers persisted in their efforts to 
wear down his resistance. They repeatedly asked him questions. (R. 611, video and 
transcript at 2-3). Even as the officers continued their questions, Tiedemann attempted to 
exercise his rights by remaining silent in the face of the officers' inquiries. (R. 611, video 
and transcript at 2-4). Yet, the officers were relentless. (Id.) 
The officers failed to take measures to ensure that any continued interrogation was 
not the result of compulsion or coercion: they failed to wait until a significant period of 
time had passed before engaging in further interrogation; they persisted in questioning 
Tiedemann about the shootings and particularly about Susan Sessions and the harm to 
her; and they failed to present a new recitation of rights per Miranda before they engaged 
in further questioning. See Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-105. 
In fact, the officers here misled Tiedemann about his rights. Instead of waiting 
and then later providing fresh warnings and obtaining a waiver before continuing (see 
Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-05), the officers advised Tiedemann that he could "answer this 
question, not answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question." (R. 
611, video and transcript at 2-3). That was deceptive. The officers demonstrated here 
that they would not honor a suspect who did not answer questions: they continued to 
press Tiedemann after he stated he did not want to talk about the shootings. (Id.) In 
addition, the officers' advice was erroneous. If a suspect were to answer some questions 
and not others, a court may not construe that act to support an invocation of Miranda 
rights. See Davis, 512 U.S. 459 (equivocal statements and actions do not constitute 
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invocation of Miranda). The officers provided misleading advice. 
After making several efforts to encourage Tiedemann to talk after invoking his 
right to remain silent, the officers finally prevailed in luring Tiedemann back into the 
conversation by misleading him. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 3). Once 
Tiedemann's resistance wore down and they persisted with the interrogation, much of the 
interview focused on Susan Session. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 3-10, 12-18, 20-
27, 29-34, (discussing Suzie)). Thus, where the trial court explicitly determined that 
Tiedemann did not want to talk about the harm to "Suzie" (R. 590), it should have 
suppressed statements made thereafter. Instead it ruled that all subsequent statements 
were admissible. (See R. 590). 
Although Tiedemann provided responses to subsequent questions, his responses 
cannot be used to support intent to cooperate. Where he invoked the right to remain 
silent, a subsequent response cannot be used to undermine the invocation or to render it 
vague or ambiguous. See e.g. Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98 (stating that once a defendant 
invokes his rights per Miranda, if officers continue questioning, courts may not look to 
the responses to find the invocation ambiguous; subsequent responses must be suppressed 
since the officers failed to scrupulously honor the request). 
Statements obtained by the officers after Tiedemann invoked the right to remain 
silent must be suppressed as violative of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. In this case, the 
trial court failed to properly apply the law. (See R. 590 (refusing to suppress subsequent 
statements)). Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling 
and order suppression of the confessions, where they were unlawful. 
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POINT II. THE GOVERNMENTS DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN A 
CRIMINAL CASE DISADVANTAGES A DEFENDANT; FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF A CASE OR SANCTIONS WHEN 
THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS EVIDENCE. ALSO, UNDER A STATE 
ANALYSIS, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS EVIDENCE THE 
COURT SHOULD APPLY A BALANCING TEST FOR A REMEDY. 
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLFUL DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
VIOLATES FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. 
The state and federal constitutions provide that a person shall not be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV, § 1; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has set 
forth the test to determine whether the government's destruction of evidence rises to the 
level of a due process violation. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court 
ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated if the 
government suppresses material, exculpatory evidence - regardless of whether the 
government acted in good or bad faith. Id. at 87. 
Next, in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the Court considered the 
constitutional ramifications when officers collected breath samples for intoxilyzer testing, 
then destroyed the samples after testing. In Trombetta, the tested samples contained no 
apparent exculpatory value to the defendant. Also, officers did not ordinarily preserve 
the samples in their day-to-day operations. Id. at 483. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the matter as follows: 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal 
prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We 
have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants 
be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. To safeguard 
that right, the Court has developed "what might loosely be called the area of 
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constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." Taken together, this group of 
constitutional privileges delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the 
accused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring 
the integrity of our criminal justice system. 
Id. at 485 (cites omitted). 
With regard to preserving evidence, the Court ruled that the government had a 
duty to preserve if evidence may play a "significant role in the suspect's defense." IcL at 
488. Also, the government would be required to preserve evidence that had apparent 
exculpatory value if the defendant would be "unable to obtain" evidence comparable 
thereto through "other reasonably available means." Id. In Trombetta, the destruction of 
breath samples after testing did not violate due process. The parties there had access to 
test results, and the defendants could challenge the results by examining the process even 
"without resort to preserved breath samples." Id. at 489-90. 
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the Court considered the failure of 
the police to properly preserve untested evidence. In that case, a boy was taken to the 
hospital for tests after he was sexually assaulted. Id. at 52-53. A physician treating the 
boy collected samples for testing. Id. at 53. Officers also collected the boy's clothing. 
The officers refrigerated the specimen samples, but not the clothing. IdL The boy 
identified the defendant Youngblood as the assailant, h i 
When a criminologist later tested the refrigerated specimen, he concluded that 
sexual contact had occurred with the boy. Id. However, later tests for blood type were 
inconclusive. Id. at 54. The state disclosed the information to the defense. Id, at 55. 
Thereafter, the case went to trial. Youngblood's "principal defense was that the 
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boy had erred in identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 54. Experts for 
both parties testified as to what technicians may have learned from the samples if they 
had tested them shortly after police gathered the evidence or if the police had refrigerated 
the clothing. Id. The jury then convicted the defendant and he appealed to the state court. 
After reversal there, the government sought review in the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court ruled that for due process purposes, a defendant must show 
that police acted in bad faith when they failed to preserve potentially exculpatory 
evidence. 
We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both 
limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable 
bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most 
clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct 
indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. We 
therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of 
the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a 
denial of due process of law. 
Id. at 58 (emphasis added). Thus, while bad faith is not a consideration when the state 
fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, "the Due 
Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to 
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been 
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant." 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57; see ateo State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^47, 106 P.3d 734 
(stating that under a federal analysis the defendant carries the burden to show that police 
acted in bad faith in losing the evidence; also, finding that the defendant never raised the 
issue of bad faith and he did not present evidence concerning "the intentions of the police 
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officers or the State Crime Lab with regard to the evidence"). 
In this case, the uncontested facts are as follows: On November 2, 1991, police 
collected physical evidence in connection with an investigation into the shootings at 3874 
Hummingbird Street. (R. 389; see 477-78, 601). The items included two handguns, 
ballistic evidence, "Code R" data from Deborah Sutherland, blood and tissue samples, 
gunshot residue tests from Deborah Sutherland and Tiedemann, fingerprints, drugs, 
paraphernalia, and items of clothing and bedding. (R. 389; see 477-78, 601; see also 
Addendum E, hereto). 
Tiedemann ultimately was charged with capital murder. (R. 389, 477). In early 
1992, Tiedemann was declared to be incompetent. On June 11, 1992, the state dismissed 
the charges. (R. 389; see 477-78; 601). Thereafter, Tiedemann corresponded with the 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office to inquire if prosecutors intended to pursue charges 
against him. (R. 389). "The State did not anticipate re-filing the charges because it did 
not appear that Tiedemann would ever be found competent. As a result, the West Valley 
City Police Department ultimately destroyed the evidence that was collected at the crime 
scene." (R. 478). From February 1993, through 1994 most of the physical evidence 
related to the case was destroyed without ever being tested. (R. 390; see also 601). 
In the fall of 2002, the state learned that Tiedemann would be released from the 
2
 In 1992, Title 77, Chapter 26 discussed the duties of the Bureau of Criminal Identifica-
tion, in part, to collect information and evidence about individuals accused and convicted 
of a crime. In July 1993, those laws were repealed. Today, Title 53, Chapters 1 through 
10 concern the collection and retention of evidence in a criminal case. Since those pro-
visions were not in effect when the government destroyed the evidence here, Tiedemann 
has not analyzed the government's duty in this case under Utah statutory provisions. 
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Utah State Hospital. (See R. 478; 562-63). Since Tiedemann was unable to get further 
treatment from the hospital (see R. 562), the state "re-filed" homicide charges against 
him. (See R. 478; 601). 
In trial court proceedings, the defense moved to dismiss the charges due to the 
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. (R. 388-404). The trial court denied the 
motion. It ruled that the defense failed to establish bad faith under a federal analysis. (R. 
603). That ruling is in error. 
The circumstances of this case support that the destruction of evidence constituted 
a due process violation. (See R. 388-394). The government acted in bad faith and 
destroyed evidence that could play a significant, constitutional role in the defense. (R. 
393 (identifying possible value of the evidence to the defense)). Also, the state does not 
contest that evidence comparable to that which was collected at the scene cannot be 
obtained by any other means. (See R. 477-80). 
"Bad faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a defendant 
must show that 'the police . . . by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a 
basis for exonerating the defendant.1" State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (cites omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). In this case, the government 
acted willfully when it destroyed the evidence. This is not a case where the police 
gathered information and then failed to refrigerate it (see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53), or 
destroyed it as a matter of routine after testing (see Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479). In this 
case, officers processed a crime scene and collected evidence that they considered to be 
relevant to a criminal case. Government agents preserved the evidence for years; after 
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Tiedemann was found to be incompetent and the prosecution determined not to proceed 
with charges against him, the government destroyed the evidence. (See Addendum E, 
hereto). The destruction was deliberate (R. 638:29, 30 (agents determined to destroy the 
evidence, and got the "rubber stamp")); the government destroyed potentially exculpatory 
evidence with the intent that it would not go to trial. (See e.g. R. 478 (stating that 
evidence was destroyed "[a]s a result" of the decision not to proceed with charges)). 
The prosecution's decision now to proceed with charges where it has destroyed 
most of the evidence is also in bad faith. While the state claims that it is disadvantaged in 
its case by the destroyed evidence (see R. 480), it nevertheless has determined to proceed 
based on Deborah Southerland's testimony. (See e.g. R. 630). Since Southerland's testi-
mony cannot be analyzed/compared with physical evidence from the scene, Tiedemann is 
hampered in his assessment of the matter and in cross-examining the state's key witness 
where her testimony may be in conflict with the physical evidence. (See R. 393; 638:25). 
The physical evidence had the potential of disproving Southerland's claims or 
explanations of how events transpired for cross-examination and confrontation purposes. 
See e.g. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The rights to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been 
recognized as essential to due process"). For example, if the ballistics evidence, blood 
and tissue samples, gunshot residue and fingerprint evidence were such that it would 
support that Southerland was involved in the shootings, that evidence would serve to 
impeach Southerland's credibility and her claims regarding Tiedemann's actions. (See 
e.g. R. 630:5-37 (claiming that Tiedemann acted alone)). Where she is the primary 
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witness for the prosecution in the case, such impeachment evidence would be pertinent to 
cross-examination and it likely would have an impact on jurors and the level of the 
offense or offenses they may be willing to consider to render a verdict. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991) (defining murder); 76-5-205 (1990) (defining reckless 
manslaughter); 76-5-206 (1990) (defining negligent homicide). 
The same can be said of the Code R examination. Where Southerland claimed 
that Tiedemann sexually assaulted her (R. 630:26-27), information in the Code R may 
have shown that Southerland did not suffer trauma, tenderness, redness, or bruising to the 
genitalia for forced penetration. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-405 & 76-5-406 (1990 & 
Supp. 1992) (defining sexual assault as non-consensual and with force, violence, or 
coercion). Such physical evidence, again, would be relevant to impeaching Southerland's 
credibility for cross-examination and confrontation purposes. 
In addition, evidence tying the drugs and paraphernalia to Southerland and other 
individuals in the trailer may create doubt in the minds of jurors that Southerland could 
accurately observe events as she claimed (R. 630:5-37 (Southerland testified to events 
she observed)), or it may provide information concerning the extent to which the actions 
of others may have contributed to or caused the shootings. If others made threats to 
Tiedemann in their drug-induced state, he may have perceived them to be a danger, for a 
lesser offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 ( 1990) (defining manslaughter). 
Without analyses, the defense has no way to demonstrate to the jury that items 
collected at the scene failed to corroborate Southerland's claims in the matter, or claims 
from investigating witnesses. Where the defendants in Trombetta and Youngblood had 
41 
test results and were able to cross-examine officers and technicians on their testing ability 
to assail credibility, none of that is available to Tiedemann. 
Finally, physical and potential forensic evidence comparable to that which was 
collected at the scene is not available. (R. 638:30-32 (the state acknowledged it is left 
with a video of the scene, and statements from officers, the medical examiner, and 
witnesses; no physical evidence)). 
Tiedemann has demonstrated that his right to a fair trial is impaired by the govern-
ment's destruction of evidence collected at the scene. He has demonstrated that agents 
acted deliberately and in bad faith in destroying preserved evidence; he has demonstrated 
the potential relevance of such evidence to his case; and no evidence exists comparable to 
that which was destroyed. (R. 388-94; 638:19-25). Tiedemann respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and dismiss the charges. 
B. UNDER A STATE LAW ANALYSIS, THIS COURT MAY APPLY A 
BALANCING TEST FOR A REMEDY WHEN STATE AGENTS DESTROY 
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
This Court has interpreted the Utah Constitution in ways separate from the federal 
constitution. It has relied on the state constitution to more fully protect the citizens of this 
State against government action. See e.g. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah 
1988) (relying on art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution to strike sentencing provisions); see 
also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993) (stating that the language of article I, 
§ 24 may lead to a different result under a state constitutional analysis); State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (construing the Utah Constitution in the area of search 
and seizure law); Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 10, 
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14-15 (Utah 1992); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-18 (Utah 1991). 
Utah's due process provision guarantees access to information in proceedings. See 
e.g., State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (stating that art. I, § 7 requires a 
judge to act on reasonably reliable information in sentencing); State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 
644, 647 (Utah 1986); see also Labrum v. Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993) 
(ensuring access to information for inmate board hearings under Utah's provision). 
Also, this Court has ruled that fundamental fairness requires that procedures in the 
guilt phase of a criminal case "be designed to insure that the decision-making process is 
based on accurate information." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980). State 
due process bars the use of potentially unreliable information at trial. See State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991) (concluding that the standard for 
admissibility of eyewitness identification under art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution 
diverges from the standard under the federal due process clause). In addition, it 
guarantees an accused the right, among other things, to "submit evidence, examine and 
cross-examine witnesses." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 315 & 317 (Utah 1945). 
This Court has stated that "the mandate of the due process clause of article I, sec-
tion 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive in its appli-
cation to all activities of state government. It is the province of the judiciary to assure that 
a claim of the denial of due process by an arm of government be heard and, if justified, 
that it be vindicated." Foote v. Ut. Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
In the event this Court is not persuaded that the record here supports that govern-
ment agents acted in bad faith when they destroyed evidence related to the scene, 
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Tiedemann urges this Court to undertake an analysis independent from that developed 
under the federal constitution. See State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 
1988) (recognizing this Court will engage in a state constitutional analysis if a party 
presents an argument for a different analysis under the state provision), vacated on other 
grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). This Court may ensure 
fundamental fairness to the defendant under article I, section 7. See Hulbert v. State, 607 
P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) (stating that the provisions of the constitution ensuring due 
process are designed to protect the individual from state action "and not the converse"). 
Specifically, this Court may reject the Youngblood approach. It may recognize 
that due process is not concerned just with bad faith actions. State due process ensures 
fundamental fairness. See e.g. State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,1J15, 34 P.3d 767 (funda-
mental fairness is the touchstone of due process). A function of fundamental fairness is 
. • I • • . . . 
to preserve the "integrity of the process itself." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909. 
To that end, where the state has destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence in a 
case, it is unreasonable to have the due process analysis hinge on one factor: whether the 
defendant was able to prove that the government acted in bad faith. Youngblood, 488 
U.S. at 58. That requirement is particularly onerous where the defendant did not collect 
the evidence, he was not involved in the decision to prosecute based on the evidence, he 
was not in control of the evidence or the case, and he did not destroy or mishandle the 
evidence. Generally the defendant is not in a position to prove the reasons for destruction 
or the significance of the evidence to the case. (See R. 401; 638:26 (arguing that the state 
was in possession and control of the information regarding the evidence)). 
44 
The state is in the best position to make the relevant showings. The state's agents 
collected and handled the evidence, and observed the condition of the evidence at the 
time it was collected. The state agents have personal knowledge concerning the 
evidence, how it would have related to trial, and how it appeared before destruction. (R. 
638:29, 30, 31 (stating that the state agents and officers collected the evidence and 
destroyed it)). The state agents are in possession of information regarding the evidence, 
particularly its significance to the case and its reasons for destruction. See e.g. State v. 
Smith, 2005 UT 57, Tf 19, 122 P.3d 615 (stating that the party in the better position to 
prove the matter must bear the burden; defendant must bear the initial burden of proving 
an affirmative defense); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-18, 921 (Utah 1987) (stating 
that even it the prosecution acted in good faith when it failed to produce items in dis-
covery, it carries the burden to show why the failure did not prejudice the defense). 
In a pre-Youngblood case, this Court did not require the defendant to prove that 
the government acted in bad faith when it destroyed evidence. 5See State v. Shaffer, 725 
P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986). It considered and balanced several factors to determine whether 
the government's destruction of evidence violated due process. Id. at 1304-06. 
In Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, the defendant claimed his rights were violated under 
article I, section 7 and the federal constitution when the state cremated the victim's body 
before the defendant could analyze the victim's hands for the presence of gunpowder 
residue, id. at 1304-05. The defendant asserted that he was denied the opportunity to test 
the hands, Id. at 1304; and he claimed that the state's failure to adequately investigate the 
body violated his rights to a fair trial. Id. 
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In assessing the matter, this Court considered several factors. It recognized that 
the government had a duty to preserve evidence and to disclose it to the defendant. See 
id. at 1304-05, 1306. It stated that the "intent or purpose of the prosecution in destroying 
the evidence is irrelevant," id. at 1305; and it assessed the significance of the destroyed 
evidence, as demonstrated in testimony from agent Donald Havekost and the medical 
examiner. kL at 1304-05 (stating that the state's witnesses explained that gunpowder 
deposits on the victim's hands would be insignificant due to several circumstances 
surrounding the condition of the body). Also, in connection with the defendant's claim 
concerning the state's failure to investigate, the Court considered the state's reasons for 
disposing of the body as permitted by law, and whether the defendant established pre-
judice. See id. at 1306. Based on an assessment of several considerations, this Court 
determined that the destruction of evidence did not violate due process. Id. at 1305-07. 
Where this Courl did not require the defendant in Shaffer to prove that the govern-
ment acted in bad faith when it destroyed evidence, see id., it should not now require 
such a showing under a due process analysis for the state constitution. See Utah Const, 
art. I, § 7; (see R. 394, 399-400 (requesting that the trial court reject Youngblood's 
onerous requirement that the defendant prove bad faith; arguing that other considerations 
may be relevant to ensure fundamental fairness; and citing to jurisdictions that have 
adopted a balancing approach)). This Court may interpret Utah's due process provision 
to require the trial court to consider and balance several factors for a remedy when the 
state destroys potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the Youngblood litmus test of one factor 
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in favor of a separate state analysis. See e.g. Thorne v. Dept of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 
1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593 (Conn. 1995) (rejecting 
the litmus test of bad faith set forth in Youngblood, and adopting a balancing test, which 
weighs the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the degree of prejudice 
to the defendant); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 916-17 (Tenn. 1999) ("Because we 
deem the preservation of the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial to be a 
paramount consideration here, we join today those jurisdictions which have rejected the 
Youngblood analysis"); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 511, 512 (W. Va. 1995) 
(holding that state constitutional due process and fundamental fairness require a rejection 
of Youngblood); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994) (rejecting Youngblood 
based on state constitutional grounds); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 
497 (Mass. 1991); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989) (refusing to adopt 
Youngblood approach; applying a balancing test). 
In Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, the defendant was charged with vehicular 
homicide as a result of an accident where his two companions were killed. Id. at 83-84. 
The defendant was found in the driver's seat, and he told police at the hospital that he was 
the driver, hi At trial, he denied that he drove, and an expert testified that the force of 
the impact may have caused the operator and passenger to switch places. Id at 84-85. 
An examination of the vehicle would have been important to the defense. However, the 
police no longer had the vehicle. See id. at 85. 
In considering the due process question, the Delaware court refused to adopt the 
Youngblood approach. See id. at 87. Instead it affirmed an analysis under the state 
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constitution that evaluated the matter in the context of the entire case. Id. at 85-87. It 
considered whether the evidence at issue would have been material and discoverable 
under Brady or state law. Id. at 86. Also, the duty to preserve and the consequences of 
destroying evidence turned on several factors. 
First, the court would consider the government's culpability in destroying the 
evidence. It stated, "[w]hen evidence has not been preserved, the conduct of the State's 
agents is a relevant consideration, but it is not determinative." Id. at 87. That is, the 
analysis would not hinge on the good or bad faith of the agent. 
Second, the court would consider the significance of the missing evidence and the 
availability of secondary evidence. Id. at 87. Third, it would consider the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain a conviction. Id. Even with sufficient evidence, if the state 
breached its duty to preserve, defendant may be entitled to a remedy. See id. at 86, 90. 
Tiedemann urges this Court to adopt a balancing test under the Utah Constitution. 
See Utah Const, art. I, §7; see also Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 491 ("Rules concerning 
preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional law") 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Such an analysis would evaluate the destruction of 
potentially useful evidence in the context of the entire case. It would balance the 
defendant's due process concerns with the state's interests in the proceedings; and it 
would balance the state's conduct against the degree of prejudice to the defendant. 
Under a balancing approach, the government's negligence/culpability in destroying 
the evidence would be only one factor. The trial court would also consider the 
government's duty to preserve evidence, the significance of the destroyed evidence, the 
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sufficiency of the remaining evidence, and the remedy available to the defendant. 
Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87-90. 
Applying those standards here, government agents collected evidence at the scene 
and preserved it for more than a year after the shootings. (See R. 478; 638:30-31). The 
government had a duty to preserve the evidence. See Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306 (stating 
that the prosecution has a duty "to preserve that [evidence] which comes into [the 
prosecutor's] possession either as a tangible object or sense impression, if it is reasonably 
apparent the object or sense impression potentially constitute [sic] material evidence" 
(cite omitted)). The evidence would have been discoverable under Utah law. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 16; (R. 25-27 (requesting Brady evidence, physical evidence and test results)). 
In this case, the government destroyed the evidence "[a]s a result" of the 
prosecutions' decision not to pursue charges. (R. 478; 638:30 (stating the evidence got 
the "rubber stamp" for destruction)). Evidence was destroyed without ever being tested. 
Tiedemann maintains that the evidence would have been significant to his case. 
Physical evidence from the scene and forensic evidence may serve to discredit the state's 
key witness or statements made by investigating officers about the scene. Such evidence 
may provide the basis for cross-examination and confrontation, or it may support a lesser 
offense or acquittal. See e.g. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ (37, 27 P.3d 1115 (recognizing 
that a state witness acknowledged on cross-examination at defendant's trial for murder 
that the "physical evidence was consistent with either an accident or a homicide"). 
If physical evidence serves to discredit the state's key witness or to impeach her 
testimony, that would be relevant to the jury in making credibility determinations about 
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the witness. Impeachment evidence can play a pivotal role. Where such impeachment 
evidence has been destroyed by the government, the lack of evidence may mean the 
difference between a guilty verdict, a verdict on a lesser offense, or an acquittal. Thus, 
the destruction of such evidence would be prejudicial to a defendant. See e.g. State v. 
Martin, 2002 UT 34, ^48, 44 P.3d 805 (recoginizing that impeachment evidence may im-
pact on a jury's assessment and discredit the state's witness; thus, there is a likelihood of 
an outcome more favorable to the defendant). Defendant would be entitled to a remedy. 
To ensure due process under the circumstances, Tiedemann is entitled to a process 
that considers and balances several factors, including the agents' destruction of 
discoverable evidence, the significance of such evidence, the prejudice to the defendant, 
and an appropriate remedy. See e.g. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86-87. 
Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court adopt such an analysis under the 
Utah Constitution, and remand this case for further proceedings on the matter. (See R. 
394, 397-98, 399-400 (arguing that the Youngblood analysis fails to adequately protect 
defendant's due process concerns; requesting a separate analysis under article I, section 7; 
citing to jurisdictions that have adopted the balancing approach)). 
CONCLUSION 
Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court order suppression of the 
confessions, where the officers' interrogation violated the law; and he respectfully 
requests further proceedings to demonstrate a due process violation under the Utah 
Constitution, where the state destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence. 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT Z * 2005 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
The State of Utah, 
Respondent, 




This matter is before the court upon a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on October 17, 
2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition is granted. 
This matter shall be consolidated for briefing and argument 
with the prior appeal in this case. A briefing schedule will be 
established hereafter. In the prior order granting permission to 
appeal an interlocutory order, this Court inadvertently included 
language suspending the provision of rule 26(a) that permits the 
parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their 
briefs on the merits. That portion of the prior order is here 
revoked. The briefing shall be governed by the Appellate Rules 
as currently in effect, and by future orders, if any, of this 
Court. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Michael J. Wilkins 
Associate Chief Justice 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 17 2005 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
The State of Utah, 
Respondent, 




This matter is before the court upon a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on August 10, 
2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition is granted only as to the 
first three issues presented. The Petition is denied with 
respect to the fourth issue because Petitioner failed to document 
any order issued on the Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of 
Exculpatory Evidence. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Z/rfT 
Date Michael J. Wilkins 




[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENTS Amend . XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to-enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 021912452 
vs. s 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements. The Motion raises three 
legal issues. First, whether defendant invoked his Miranda rights; 
second, whether defendant's confession was involuntary; and 
finally, whether defendant was competent during his interrogation. 
FACTS 
Detective Ron Edwards ("Det. Edwards") and Sergeant Ed Spann 
("Sgt. Spann") of the West Valley Police Department, began the 
interrogation of defendant, Edgar Tiedemann, on November 2, 1991, 
at 1:58 p.m. Det. Edwards began by asking the defendant to sign 
the paper placed before him and explained for the benefit of the 
camera and the defendant that defendant had received his Miranda 
rights and was not intoxicated. The defendant corrected Det. 
Edwards, stating that he was intoxicated on Toluene. Det. Edwards 
asked the defendant how long he had been intoxicated on Toluene and 
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the defendant responded, stating "since 1962." When asked if he 
was incapable of understanding or answering questions, the 
defendant responded, "Sometimes, I don't know." At this point, the 
tape stopped and started again at 2:13 p.m. 
Det. Edwards read the defendant his Miranda rights. The 
defendant said that he was intoxicated on Toluene and confirmed 
that he was willing to answer questions with the police and did so 
voluntarily. The defendant continued the interrogation with his 
head lowered, and he infrequently looked up into the camera. 
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the 
defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." Immediately 
afterward, when asked, "What don't you want to talk about?" he 
remained silent. Immediately thereafter, when asked, "Who is 
Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love." The 
defendant readily answered other questions throughout the 
interrogation, except when asked, "What happened to Suzie?" 
The defendant did not remember the day of the week even though 
Det. Edwards told him the date at the beginning of the interview, 
and he did not remember if the victims moved in his house during 
the day or night. The defendant did provide several complex 
answers during the interrogation, including the license number and 
make of his car, the year he had his stroke, the physical effects 
of his stroke and other detailed information. 
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When responding to Det. Edwards1 question if he had any mental 
problems, the defendant said "Ya. All kinds. See, I think I'm 
Adolph Hitler. Adolph Hitler died in May of 1945 and I was born in 
19, October 1946. I think I'm Adolph Hitler." When asked by Det. 
Edwards if he heard voices, the defendant stated, "I think so. I 
don't know." When asked by Det. Edwards who was telling him to 
shoot them, the defendant responded, "the devil." The defendant 
also responded that he was a religious person. 
The defendant's interview ended at 2:58 p.m., having lasted 
just under one hour. During the interview, he did not request a 
break, did not directly request to stop the interview or request to 
have an attorney present. 
ANALYSIS 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.1" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 163 (1986) . A defendant in custody has the right to 
remain silent, the right to have an attorney present and the right 
to stop an interrogation at any time. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1964). Under the Due Process Clause, "certain interrogation 
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique 
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a 
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned." Id. 
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"Voluntariness" is not the sole consideration when considering 
whether admission of a confession violates the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1999). 
"Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding 
that a confession is not vvoluntary.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. 
Analysis of whether a confession is admissible must consider the 
"totality of circumstances" to determine if the confession was 
"made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of 
any sort." Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993). The 
"totality of the circumstances" takes into account "both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation." State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989). 
"Courts must consider such external factors as the duration of the 
interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery, 
absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the 
defendant by the officers." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1013. 
"Courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's 
mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, 
age, and familiarity with the judicial system." Id. at 1014. 
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court states, "a defendant's mental 
condition is not in itself sufficient to make a confession 
involuntary." Id. The mental state of a defendant "is relevant to 
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the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally coercive police 
tactics." Id. 
The court sets forth objective and subjective factors that a 
court should consider when conducting a "totality of the 
circumstances" examination. Id. at 1015. Objective factors 
include police misrepresentation, the false friend technique, 
threats and promises and other factors such as "whether the 
defendant is subject to extended periods of incommunicado." id. at 
1015-1018. In explaining subjective factors, the court lists 
whether the interrogators deny any of the defendant's requests, 
whether the defendant had prior experience with the judicial 
system, whether the defendant was particularly vulnerable to 
psychological manipulation, or whether the defendant was more 
susceptible to stress and coercion than the average person. Jd. at 
1019-1020. 
I. Violation of Miranda 
The defense argues the defendant affirmatively invoked his 
right to remain silent, and that right was violated when police 
detectives continued his interrogation. The defendant cites State 
v. Guiterrez, 864 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah App. 1993), to show that an 
effective initial waiver of the right to remain silent does not 
nullify a suspect's ability to subsequently invoke this right 
during the course of an interrogation. In Guiterrez, when the 
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defendant said, "I ain't going to say nothing," the Utah Court of 
Appeals found the defendant invoked his Miranda rights. Id. In 
Guiterrez, with continued questions and the police interrogator's 
suggestion that he was only using self-defense, the defendant was 
provoked into a confession. Id. Guiterrez is distinguishable 
because the interrogators were more forceful and suggestive in 
their questioning and the defendant was referring to the entire 
interview, not a particular question. 
Here, the defendant did not want to talk about the specific 
bodily harm to Suzie, but was otherwise cooperative and willing to 
talk to the interrogators. The defendant answered affirmatively 
that he understood his Miranda rights, he refused to answer 
questions regarding the bodily harm that was inflicted upon Suzie, 
but unhesitatingly answered all other questions. His purposeful 
silence lasted only a brief period of time and only to questions 
regarding bodily injury to Suzie. He did not indicate, at any 
time, that he wished to stop the interrogation. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant did not invoke 
his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Court need not reach the issue 
of whether the defendant's statements are still admissible for 
purposes of impeachment. 
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II. Involuntary Statements 
The defense argues that the defendant's statements were not 
made voluntarily, in violation of federal due process. In 
analyzing whether the defendant's confession is voluntary, the 
Court will address both the objective and subjective factors of the 
defendant•s interrogation. 
a. Police Misrepresentation, False Friend Technique, Threats 
or Promises and Other Objective Factors 
The defense argues the defendant's interrogation was subject 
to police coercion due to questionable interrogation techniques. 
Specifically, the defense cites Rettenberger to show the use of 
false friend technique, mental coercion, the lack of presence of 
counsel, family or friends. 984 P. 2d at 1013. Rettenberger is 
clearly distinguishable in that the police coercion was much more 
extensive. Here, the interrogators did not make use of false 
statements or half-truths. They did not use the false friend 
technique by implying they were acting in the best interest of the 
defendant by the simple use of his first name. The detectives did 
not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a 
confession. The entire interrogation took place within one hour, 
and during the investigation the interrogators did not deny any 
special requests of the defendant. There is no evidence of any 
ethical misconduct by the police. In short, the record shows that 
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the detective's interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive 
techniques. The Court finds no reason to believe the interrogation 
method used techniques that were sufficient to render the 
defendant's confession involuntary. 
b. Subjective Factors That Make the Defendant More 
Susceptible to Manipulation 
Turning to a review of the subjective factors that may make 
the defendant more susceptible to manipulation is a more difficult 
process than reviewing for police misconduct. The defense argues 
that the defendant's diminished mental capacity, the influence of 
drugs, his references to Hitler and Satan, and his lack of verbal 
skills and ability to express himself deem the defendant incapable 
of a voluntary confession. 
The defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, the stroke he 
suffered in 1982, or a head injury received as a child might be the 
cause of his generalized cerebral damage resulting in severe 
impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q. (Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.) The defendant's 
reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he 
knows Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he 
is Hitler. His reference to Satan telling him to commit the 
criminal act may also stem from his religious beliefs. "A 
perception of coercion flowing from the "voice of God' is a matter 
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to which the Federal Constitution does not speak." Connelly, 479 
U.S. at 517. In reviewing defendant's interrogation it is evident 
he did not answer all questions intelligently. On the other hand, 
the defendant provided clear and detailed answers to many of the 
questions. 
III. Incompetent 
The defense argues that the defendant was incompetent, 
rendering him incapable of voluntarily and knowingly waiving his 
constitutional rights at the time of his interrogation. The 
defense cites Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), where 
the Supreme Court held the defendant's confession involuntary and 
reversed the conviction. There the defendant had a long history of 
mental illness, was interrogated for eight to nine hours in a small 
room filled with police officers with no relatives or counsel 
present and his confession was written by a police officer. The 
court found that the defendant was "insane" before, during and 
after the robbery. At the time of the robbery he was absent 
without authorization from a mental ward, where he had been placed 
due to his Veteran's Administration classification of 100% 
incompetence resulting from a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reactive, 
paranoid type." Id. at 201. The factors addressed by the court in 
Blackburn are not present in the instant case. Prior to his 
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interrogation, defendant had not been found incompetent or 
"insane," and similar coercive factors were absent. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's interrogation, including his treatment by the 
detectives and his mental state, the Court finds his confession did 
not violate his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights and is 
admissible. The Motion to Suppress is denied. 
/ ^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 021912452 
vs. : 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Quash 
Count III, or, Alternatively, Motion to Amend Count III, and 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of Exculpatory 
Evidence. This Court has reviewed the Memoranda of counsel and 
heard oral argument on these Motions. 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH COUNT III, OR ALTERNATIVELY 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNT III 
Defendant argues that Count III of the Information, the count 
that alleges Murder of Scott Liam Bunnell, Jr., should be dismissed 
because the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary 
hearing. At the preliminary hearing, Deborah Southerland Pryor 
testified that on the evening in question she was in the bedroom of 
defendant's trailer when he came in, shot several times into the 
ttv CferV  
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bedroom, closed the door and left. She heard several shots fired 
in the front room, and subsequently went out to the front room and 
observed Mr. Bunnell's injuries. In addition, the State submitted 
an autopsy by Dr. Edward Leis, completed after Mr. Bunnell's death 
in 2001. The autopsy concluded that Mr. Bunnell had died from 
complications of paraplegia caused by the gunshot wound inflicted 
by defendant. 
At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense 
has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. 
Clark, 20 P. 3d 300 (Utah 2001) . At a preliminary hearing "the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution." State v. Hester, 3 P. 3d 725, 728 (Utah App. 
2000) . This Court finds that evidence produced by the State at 
preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind over Count III. In the 
alternative, the defendant has moved the Court to amend Count III 
to Attempted Homicide. Having found that there is sufficient 
evidence to bind over Count III on the greater offense, the 
alternative Motion need not be addressed. Therefore, defendant's 
Motion is denied. 
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II. MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DESTRUCTION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the charges against 
him based on the State's "willful destruction of all potentially 
exculpatory evidence." 
Defendant argues that the destruction of the evidence is in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated 
Murder, one count of Attempted Aggravated Murder, one count of 
Aggravated Kidnapping, and one Count of Aggravated Sexual Assault. 
All charges were dismissed on June 11, 1992, after defendant was 
found incompetent to stand trial. After that time, numerous items, 
including handguns, ballistic evidence, "Code R" data, blood and 
tissue samples, gunshot residue tests, fingerprints, drugs and 
paraphernalia, and clothing and bedding items were destroyed. 
These items were destroyed sometime between 1993 and 1994. In 
2002, defendant was found competent to stand trial and charges were 
re-filed. Defendant is now charged with three counts of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder, all first degree felonies. 
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Under federal law, a defendant's due process rights are 
violated if evidence destroyed has "exculpatory value that was 
apparent before the evidence was destroyed and [is] of such nature 
that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means." California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479, 489 (1984) . The destroyed evidence also must be 
material, and "the possibility that the [evidence] could have 
exculpated [defendant] if preserved or tested is not enough to 
satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality." Arizona v. 
Youngblgod, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) . If evidence is only 
potentially useful, defendant bears the burden to show that police 
acted in bad faith in not preserving the evidence. Id. "Bad 
faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a 
defendant must show that 'the police...by their conduct indicate 
that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant.'" State v. Holden. 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1988) 
(quoting Youngblood, at 109). 
Defendant asserts that "bad faith should be presumed in this 
case unless and until the government is able to offer an 
explanation for the destruction of this evidence." Defendant's 
Memorandum at pp. 6-7. Defendant misstates the legal requirement. 
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As stated infra, the burden is upon the defendant to show that the 
State acted in bad faith in destroying the aforementioned property. 
The defendant has failed to meet that burden. 
Defendant further argues that under the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 12, defendant is afforded a higher degree of 
protection than under the Federal Constitution. The State argues 
that defendant's argument lacks merit because Utah has adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's standard. This Court cannot find 
support for the State's argument. Both cases cited by the State in 
support, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999), and State v. 
Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1998), were based on the state 
courts adhering to federal precedent when issues are argued under 
the Federal Constitution. Defendant correctly notes that Utah 
appellate courts on occasion have been willing to consider a 
different interpretation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
14, than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
addressing the matter of search and seizure. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate 
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the 
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federal courts." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990), (quoting 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, at n.8 (Utah 1988)). 
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73, n. 5 (Utah App. 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals suggested a three-prong analysis 
in determining whether the Utah Constitution should be interpreted 
differently from a similar provision in the United States 
Constitution. First, the moving party should analyze the "unique 
context in which Utah's Constitution developed", second, "should 
demonstrate the willingness of state appellate courts to regularly 
interpret textually similar state constitution provisions in a 
manner different from federal interpretation of the United States 
Constitution, and that it is entirely proper to do so in the 
federal system," and third, the moving party should cite to "other 
states supporting the particular construction urged by counsel." 
id. 
In the instant case, defendant has offered no analysis 
concerning the unique context in which Utah's Constitution 
developed, nor shown why this State's Constitution should be 
interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution. 
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In addition, defendant has made reference to numerous cases in 
other state jurisdictions that have "rejected Younqblood". 
However, defendant has not articulated the rulings of other states 
correctly. For example, in State v. Morales , 657 A.2d 585, 594 
(Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded: 
That the good or bad faith of the police in failing to 
preserve potentially useful evidence cannot be 
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been 
deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, we, too, 
reject the litmus test of bad faith on the part of police 
which the United States Supreme Court adopted under the 
Federal Constitution and Younqblood. Rather, in 
determining whether a defendant has been afforded due 
process of law under the state constitution, the trial 
court must employ...[a] balancing test, weighing the 
reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against 
the degree of prejudice to the accused. More 
specifically, the trial court must balance the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the missing evidence, 
including the following factors: The materiality of 
missing evidence, the likelihood of mistaken 
interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, the reason 
for its nonavailability to the defense, and the prejudice 
to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the 
evidence. (Quoting State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227 
(1984)). 
In the instant case, defendant has only urged this Court to 
reject the bad faith Younqblood standard, but he has not suggested 
a viable alternative standard. 
Because defendant has failed to offer a Utah Constitutional 
basis, nor a viable alternative to Younqblood based on the Utah 
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Constitution, this Court cannot appropriately address the 
constitutional issue. Therefore, this Court finds defendant's Utah 
Constitutional argument inadequate. 
Accordingly, having found no United States Constitutional 
basis nor Utah Constitutional basis to dismiss this case, 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon destruction of exculpatory 
evidence is denied. 
Dated this rf day of September, 2005. 
m 
UDITH S.f ^ ^^EfitBRTON 
I STRICT SOTDKT JUPGE ~ 
I A\ rio 
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ADDENDUM E 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH DEC 1 2 2005 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Case No. 20050676-SC 
021912452 
Edgar Tiedemann, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
The court grants the Petitioners' stipulated motion to 
supplement the record on appeal with the true and correct copy 
of the "Property Disposition Inquiry Report", which was 
originally included as a Addendum to the Defendant's " Motion to 
Dismiss Based on Destruction of Evidence," a copy of which is 
attached to the motion. 
FOR THE COURT: 
A,,-/*, IO, utof 
Date Michael J. Wilkihs 
Associate Chief Justice 
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RE: ....at 1991, the time is 2:15 PM. I'm Detective Ron Edwards, 
West Valley Police Department. Sgt. Ed Spann with the West 
Valley Police Department. I have to read you your rights per 
miranda. Do you understand that? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and 
will be used against you in a court of law. You have the 
right to have a lawyer present before any questioning. Do you 
understand that? 
ET: ...inaudible... 
RE: Do you understand that you can stop this questioning at 
anytime? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: If you cannot afford an attorney, we will provide one for you. 














Do you still wish to speak to us at this time? 
Ya. 
Are you intoxicated? 
On toluene. 
What's toluene? 
Toluene. It's, it•s a paint thinner. 
It's a paint thinner? 
Ya. 
Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you? 
Ya. 
What are we going to talk to you about? 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN 
NOVEMBER 2, 1991 
92-20773 
PAGE 2 
ET: The murders out there. 
RE: What murders? 
ET: The murders out there at West Valley. 
RE: Who are they? 
ET: Suzie, Chuck and Scotty. 
RE: Whose Suzie? 
ET: She's the woman I love. 
RE: That you love? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What happened to her? 
ET: I don't want to talk about it. 




ES: Why don't you want to talk about it? 
ET: I love that woman so much. 
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about? You said 
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley? 
ET: .... inaudible....Hummingbird Street. 
ES: I'm sorry, where? 
ET: 13 08 Hummingbird Street. 
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RE: Who lives with you? 
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in last night, I don't 
know. 
RE: Okay, what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What don't 
you want to talk about, Ed? 
ES: Edgar, we're not going to force you talk about anything. 
We're asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you 
can answers this questions, not answer that question, answer 
this question, not answer that question. You don't have to 
answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at anytime. 
ET: Okay. 
ES: He made that clear to you, right? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you 
and what part don't you want to talk to us about? 
RE: Edgar do you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you 
signing a waiver for us to search your home? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot. We got in 
there and seen some people. Who shot them? 
ET: Me. 
RE: You did? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Why did you shoot them? 
ET: I shot Suzie cause I love her and I shot the other two. 
RE: Why did you shoot Chuck for? 
ET: Just to cover up the murder. 
RE: Okay, how did Debra get, come into the picture? 
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ET: I was going to shoot her too but she was pregnant. 
RE: Okay, why? Why did you shoot them? 
ET: I shot Suzie cause I love her, I love her so much. 
RE: Was she going to leave you? 
ET: No. She wouldn't. 
RE: If you loved her that much, there's a reason why you shot her. 


















I don't know. 
Okay. What time did you shoot them? 
I don't know. 
Was it daylight? 
I don't know. 
How long have you been sniffing that solvent? 
Since 1962. 
Tonight how long? Or today? 
All day. 
Do you know what today's date is? 
You told me but I don't remember. 
Do you know what day of the week it is? 
No. 
What was yesterday? 
I don't have any idea. 
Do you work Edgar? 
No, I'm on SSI. 
TAPED INTERVIEW 




FTr Sc-ial .''•-.-cur itv Supplemental Income, 
RK: What did you shoot Suzie with? 
kh,: What did you shoe t Martin with? 
:'. : tr. Scotty. 
R' -,u^t was sleeping on the floor? 
I . . ^ . • < . . 
R] -'kay, what did ^  : shoot h i r v ith? 
F* " "• ' *• .tnow. 
i i vou shoot Chuck, "w . i i? 
Erl" "18. 
E'l * ..-. 
RF, • • - - < = > ^ 7 
I! I • • 
REi And where else? 
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ET: I didn't see where the other place was. 
RE: Was he trying to get out of the bed? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Who did you shoot first? 
ET: Suzie. 
RE: Then what happened? Did Scott wake up? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: So they were all asleep? 
ET: Ya. No they was both awake. 
RE: They were both awake talking to you? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Where were the guns at when you decided to shoot them? 
ET: My hands. 
RE: Where were the guns at before you picked up the guns? Where 
did you go get the guns from? 
ET: I picked, got them out of my room. 
RE: Is yours the bedroom way in the back? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay. You took them out of that bedroom? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Was Chuck asleep? 
ET: I think so. 
RE: Okay. When you got the guns, where were, were they already 






ET: They were already loaded. • • 
RE; Do yju always carry loaded guns in your home? 
E 
RE: What kind of car do you own? 
ET: 199? f-10. 
. ~. L^V- . ^ vnn Vnnw x, license platp number is? 
LT ti. 2221CN, 1 rr .::> . 
L'l . ••* wiii,c November ti :-•* . 
RE: Whopp i - tho hrm,^ vf H w i. t he driveway? 
^r. 
RE: Okay, wnos 
pm, ,<s^  <~v^  ,-^ ww
 u even appreci • 
¥:2: How lcm: have you and Liuzic- been together? 
She* ' L . : ros t i tu t P. . 
bet.sions 
-.*wv-u ^ o _ j " that's why she has to stupid work. 
y c u ' o . * j ,, Edgar ? 
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ET: No, I donft do, I used to do it. I done it with her for about 
two or three, I mean two or three days and it didn!t even 
effect me or anything. I know I didn't, couldn't even get 
off, just got back to toluene. 
RE: So why did you have to shoot Suzie? 
ET; I don't know, I don't know. 
ES: Does Suzie usually sleep in the bedroom with you or does she 
sleep on the couch? 
ET: No, no, she just moved in. She's... 
RE: How long have you known Suzie? 
ET: About 10 years. 
RE: And how long has she moved in with you? 
ET: She moved in about, she lived out there in Rose Park for about 
two or three months after my mom died and she got an apartment 
of her own and then. 
RE: How old are you Edgar? 
ET: 45. 
RE: How long have you been on Social Security? 
ET: Since November of 88. 
RE: Where did you work at before you went on Social Security? 
ET: I don't remember. 
RE; Do you have any physical impairments? Any physical injuries? 
ET: I had a stroke. I couldn't get out of my room for three days. 
I couldn't talk for seven. I was in the hospital for two and 
a half months. 
RE: You said you had a stroke? 
ET: Ya. 
TAPED INTERVIEW 1 
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F K ll< »w 1 - »i | in "in i '" 
ETi • inaudible. .. it was 1980, I mean 1931 , November of 1988, 
The papers are, ,i n the trailer. 
RE: Okay, Is there any mental problems? 
ETi Ya. A 1 ] Jk . " 
RE: What k..^ v^ tuer^ al pr^M^r~° 
ET: See. h^i- . -, \Ao]j *l: r er . Adolf Hitler died In May of 
" *b a:v: * , ; i-*rr ;n i October 1946, I th i nk I'm Adolf 
ES: is ru.-'io y-;.ur girlfriend? 
ETi V^ ' -^ --i her more than di rth i ng e] se i i I t:l in i s ; i : i: 3 ::i 
] /e you? 
E T : I i c > . _ • :>n f t know, I , I don't think so. I don't think she 
did. 
ES: Well you've know her off and on for ten. years and. . . 
! i " in i "i . 
ES: I s she l i v i n g In y o u r mom's house I i I Rose P a r k ? 
FT: Ya . 
I i : n :i ] :i = c t \ • ::: i: u : m : m' s 1 IC i is6 :i  i l Rose I 'ark ? 
E T : i a . . • ' 
C ' j . T A J h p ^ *-j i -* ^ / ' *• * W c c * * t V > ! <• ) 
.- - ^ » * v . y ^ i t e v e r . 
E:1: When d id sh*~ mcvt d . t ru r *- i r Vv- -(. a l l e y , jus * tor! idt>L 
n i g h t cr n:*iht b e f o r e -n . i t i ' ve r , 1 don't knov 
^ * Wfa p r p VM " A H A r n ^ < ^ r- * c *., t- -^ r -; ^,.. v
 e for e t h O n *"" 
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RE: Why did they move out to you? 
ET: Cause they got kicked out of their apartments. 
RE: Why? 
ET: They, I don't know why, they just did, I don't know. 
RE: Who's Chuck? 
ET: She's Debbie's boyfriend. That's.... 
RE: When did he get in town? 
ET: I think he came in a couple of three days ago. 
RE: Where's Debbie living? 
ET: With Suzie. 




RE; So Chuck got here and he was staying in that back bedroom too? 
ET: I guess, I don't know. 
RE: When you shot him, is that the bedroom he was.... 
ET: Ya. 
RE: And you did shoot him? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Why did you shoot him? 
ET: I don't know. I don't know. Just.... 
RE: I want you to think about this, Edgar. You shot Suzie first 
with the .22. 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN 




r?T7 Then yon ''ln'l n<'ot' t. "I,j ., 
FE: Yoa went In the bedroom to shoot chuck? 
RE: TeLl me, describe whcit happened as you. ah, did you turn cr: th-
]:7ht? 
ET: No. 
RE; Coi il d y :: i i see 1 :i :i ;r i p r e t: t::;;:r g\ : i xi I 
ET: I couldi i't, I couldn't, I, I was, I just, I couldn't even see 
I couldn't see h I m I j"i is t: actua] 3 y I -~* '^r'*- -v.-- -.-. - .• 
of them. 
ET: I'm jus t a lucky shot. • 
RE; Well you said yc; -he1" ,f i; : * . 
knew yen shot- hi * fl.roat if *-ou c;uldnft see 
FT i '
 a £ t e r w a r ( 3 S j fu r n e cj or i tl i< :: 3 :i :jl i t:. 
I i : 11 ni you ever turn I. lie 1 i gl it back off? 
ET: .- I turned . ff abcui six or seven twines, maybe more than 
w n u t. 
RE: How many times did you shoot Chuck? 
I "I I 
Kb.: Why did you shoot him, the second time? 
FT I ]ust popped off two rounds. 
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ES: How many times did you shoot Scotty? 
ET: I don't know, about four I guess I don't know, at least he 
claims. 
RE: Who claims? 
ET: Scotty. 
RE: When did you talk to Scotty? 
ET: He was still alive. 
RE; He was still alive? 
ET; Ya. 
RE: Why didn't you shoot him again? 
ET: I just couldn't handle it. 
RE: After you shot everybody, was the lights on in the trailer? 
ET: No, they was all off. One, the one light, the one back 
bedroom light was on. 
RE: That was your bedroom? 
ET: Ya, no the one this one. 
RE: The one Chuck was in? 
ET: No, the one in the hall. 
RE; Oh, the hall light? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Okay, Edgar what we'd like to do is kind of start back in the 
evening and tell us what happened. What time did they move 
into your house. 
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ET; 1 t h i nk s o . 
E S : E :» y oil 1  ::i i : • i v '. I lie week i I. w.j ,' 
ET: I < i o n 1 t h a v e any i d e a . 
RE i Was , i 1 
ET; I d o n 1 t < • r .* \ 
RE: Was everybody doing heroin in the hcuso
 v^ ..~~ ~2 j .w 
s n i f f i ng wit: h y c u'? 
ET: No, Suzit- and thorn >-ind Debbie were using heroin and ah Scotty 
was straight and, and ah, Chi ick was drunk. 1 doi i't ki low i £ he 
w a s i n t o r i c a t e d r *- v u -• ^  
RE: But he'd been drinking.1 
ET: 
RE: Everybody * - * ; ; . : , , d i d you do ? 
ET: 1 j u s t lc ' h e r e arid t h o u g h t , 
IE . E ; ' Wh- J i: c s - I : 
E T : •. b e d r o o m . 
RE; * '• by yourself? 
ET ; 
RE; What did you think about? 
on * i Know wha t: -v^ <-•"-—.—— 
*n^n you was in the bacK Uviroun, La^,^. , w:i th the gun why did 
hnvp to ao out and shont i-h^m? 
ET: * uuf , av- any idea. . • 
'<-<' * ' i H v — - *•* a *- a n y vo i c e s ? 
I 1 : i „' t ] ::i I : " i 
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RE: Who was telling you to go shoot them? 
ET: The devil. 
RE; Are you a christian man? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Do you go to church? 
ET: Ya, I got to. . .inaudible. . .don't go to church, but I became an 


















You was sitting in your bcick bedroom, where was Debbie at? 
She was in the second bedroom. 
With Chuck? 
Ya. 
You walked down the hall? 
Ah-huh. 




What happened? Was the lights on? 
No. I had the one light on in the hallway. 
Okay, you walked in.... 
... inaudible...was dim. 
Okay, you walked down.... 
Ya. 
...your's standing over Suzie, what happened? 
TAPED INTER1! IE W 




c . -' , * •-ippened. I can't, iigur*. 
just 
t • the sheet ever her h# id" ^r blanket over her head? 
„ yo\: — e her face'' 
r.'I : Ya I c: : <* • ~ 'ouldn'r. tel] if her eyes were c pe 
v -:! - • T~rv:r:G al-ou* something, T >'~M '' 
KM. Who was s;ie taiKirj tc? 
RE: Was she pleading for her life? 
E T i N o . • • 
ETi No. 
RE: She didn't see the gun at all? 
ET: No. 
RE: What d: - ^ ::u say to her before yoi i shot her ? 
ET: 
RE; Yvnac •« > -^ s a y a f t e r you s h o t h e r ? 
ET: N o t h : r * 
RE. : 
ET: No. 
j^E: After you shot her wh.it 11111 Sent t y Hi- 1 
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ET: He got up and flipped, flipped over the covers and then I shot 
him. 
RE: Where did you shoot him at? 
ET: I don't know, in the stomach or, I mean in the arms and stuff 
like that, I donft know, I couldn't see very good 
...inaudible... I just pumped about, I think I pumped two .22 
shells into him and two .38 shells into him. 
RE: What side of the mattress was you standing when you shot him? 
The kitchen side or the bedroom side of the mattress? 
ET: Bedroom side. 
RE; So how far away from you, how far away was Suzie when you shot 
her? 
ET: Ah, there's a coffee table on the end so, I guess from the 














Did you aim? 
No, I only pulled the trigger. 
Just one time? 
Ya. 
And it was a lucky shot? 
Ya. 
I don't believe you. 
I don't know, I was just... 
Were you angry with Suzie? 
Ya. 
What were you angry at her for? 
Cause she ripped me off of six or seven thousand dollars. 
How did she rip you off? 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
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/ get her husband sent to prison and she bought coke, I ;:.-
.leroin with a thousand dollars and then I qot her out of jaii 
one time and she wasn't even in \ • i 1 and that was thr^ "* 
hundred dollars, she got this ticket, Lee vnat's his na::ie. , 
- i d and Debbie Lee and they split it. up and cl ;-t it up in 
.<*:uin atd then ah, I got her, I get her an abortion and 
round Cw": sh^'d been fixed, I knew she'd been fixed but x 
mean, she didn't apprec:.itt? anyth:r.c;. 





•.'• T-t r^T.r 
z * * ' : * o ri{-f*.«j j M . fi ct t.-at mcney, .* : d j 
ever a->k lie- * ; back? 
wante-j to marry ner. She kept promising e^ she was g-in; t 
"Was you having a sexual relationship with her? 
1 a. ' 
I low many, ynn c,s> ^ w a s a prostitu^. 
Ya. 
r r i i i i\] i n i n 11111 i n i 11 i m i i n *• i i P I i • ; ? 
ET: I doi I t ki low. 
RE: "Who was h e r p i m p ? 
ET I I .1 i I .] i I i: I .I"!- w.i i 11. 
RE: L e e Ward? 
ET: Ya . 
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ET: A Niger. 
RE: Where does he live? 
ET: I don't know his exact address, somewhere in 13th South, 





















Have you ever met him? 
Ya. 
Did he know that she was living with you? 
I think so. 
What's your phone number in your house? 
It was, ah, 263-8853, but I had it disconnected. 
Why? 
Cause I didn't trust them people. 
What people? 
Chuck and them other peoples and stuff. 
When did you have it disconnected? 
Huh? 
When did you have it disconnected? 
The day they move in. 
Yesterday? 
Ya. 
How far away were you from Scott when you shot Scott? 
I was standing in the same place where I shot Suzie. 
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RE: Tell me? 
ET: I walked down the hall and I shot four rounds. 
RE: Was you shooting your right hand or left hand? 
ET: I had them in both hands. I had my .22 in my left hand and my 
.38 in my left, my right hand. 
RE: Are you right handed or left handed? 
ET: Right handed. 
ES: You had your .22 in the left hand and your .38 in the right? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: After you shot him 
ET: I felt terrible. 
RE: ...what did you do then? 
ET: I felt terrible. 
RE: I understand that, but what did you do then? After you shot 
Chuck what did you do? 
ET: I'm not sure. I laid down, I don't know what happened then. 
It was all a blur. 
RE: What did you say to Debbie? 
ET: I talked to her for about two or three hours. 
RE: Where at? 
ET: I donft know. I talked to her for several, I don't know. 
ES: You say Scotty was still alive? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What was Scotty doing? 
ET: Laying there moaning. 
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ES: How long? 
ET: All day, 
RE: Did Suzie have AIDS? 
ET: I don't think so, I don't know, I don't know. I mean I could, 
I think I got it, I don't know if I got it or what, I don't, 
that's not important. 
RE: What's that? 
ET: That's not important. 
RE: Okay. Where did you go after you left your house? 
ET: Went to get some heroin. 
RE: For who? 
ET: Debbie. 
RE: Why her? 
ET: I don't know, I wanted to get some cocaine. 
ES: For who? 
ET: I don't know, from Tony or something like that, I don't know 
their names ..inaudible... 
ES: Was that for you or for him? For you or for Debbie? 
ET: I wanted the heroin for Debbie and the cocaine for me. 
RE: How much money did you have on you? 
ET: I didn't have any money. 
ES: Who had money then? 
ET: Debbie. 
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RE: How long did you ride around with Debbie? 
ET: Well, I'd say about an hour or two, I don't know how long. 
ES: ... inaudible...drugs? 
ET: No. I found a piece in Suzie's coat pocket, here, a piece of 
heroin. 
RE: Is that Suzie's jacket? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Whose idea was it to go get drugs? 
ET: Debbie's? 
RE: Why didn't you shoot Debbie there? 
ET: I couldn't fucking handle it, I came to my senses. I don't 
know why.... 
ES: If you came to your senses, how come you didn't call somebody 
to help Scotty? 
ET: I don't know. I don't know if I came to my senses or not. 
ES: How old is Scotty? 
ET: I think he's 15. 
ES: How old's Suzie? 
ET: I think she's 33. 
RE: How old's Debbie? 
ET: I think she's 37. I think Chuck's 44. 
ES: Anything happy between you and Debbie? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What happened? 
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ET: Um, Debbie and Suzie would take turn sitting on my face and 
fucking me, 
ES: When? 
ET: Oh, a couple of times or I don't know. 
RE: Last night? 
ET: Ah, I don't know. 
RE: Did you have ah, have sex with Debbie today? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Where at? 
ET: The front room, I mean on the hall. 
RE: After you shot them? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: After you shot Suzie, Scott and Chuck, you took Debbie in the 
hallway and did she submit to you or did you rape her? 
ET: She submitted to me. 
RE: What, how did it happen? What did you say to her? 
ET: Well I had her wash her pussy out real good and I ate her out 
and then I fucked her. 
ES: Did she say anything to you? 
RE: Did she want it? 
ET: Ya, I think so. 
RE: What did she say? 
ET: She said it was real enjoyable. 
RE: When did she tell you that? 
ET: Just after we did it. 
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ES: Did you have your guns with you still? 
ET: I laid them down on the floor. 
ES: Did you have your guns with you when you made her clean 
herself? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Where was sure when you told her to get up and clean herself? 
ET: What's this? 
ES: How did this come about? You Scott, you shot Chuck, how did 
you come to talk with Debbie? What did she do? 
ET: What do you mean, what did she do. 
ES: After you shot Chuck, what did she do? She was in bed with 
him, is that correct? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: So what does she do? 
ET: Not much, she came up and we talked for a while. 
RE: What did you talk about? 
ET: How much I loved Suzie. 
RE: Did she know that you just shot Suzie and Scott? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Was she crying? 
ET: No. She had a horrified look on her face. I think it's just 
from the heroin. 
RE: After you brought her out of the bedroom, you talked for a 
while in the hallway? 
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ES: On the couch next to Suzie? 
ET: No on the other couch. 
ES: What was Scott doing all this time? 
ET: Moaning. 
ES: So you talked for two or three hours and you had her get up 
and go to the bathroom? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Did you go into the bathroom with her? 
ET: No, I just stood out in the hall. I left the door open. 
ES: Then what happened? Is that when you performed oral sex on 
her? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What was she wearing? 
ET: Ah, a yell, I mean a white terry cloth towel, or a terry cloth 
robe or whatever it is. 




ES: Was she wearing any clothes when she was in bed with Chuck? 
ET: No. 
RE: Why didn't you go back in your bedroom? Edgar? Why didn't 
you take Debbie back into her bedroom? Back into your 
bedroom? 
ET: I don't know, I just, I didn't think Suzie was dead. 
RE: Okay. Suzie was sleeping on the couch. 
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RE: Scott's sleeping on the floor. How come Suzie's not sleeping 
in your bedroom with you? 
ET: She wouldn't do it. 
RE: She'd make love to you but she wouldn't sleep with you? 
ET: No. 
ES: Did you have intercourse with her that night? 
ET: No. 
ES: When was the last time you had intercourse with Suzie? 
ET: Two or three days ago. Me and, me and Debbie and Suzie did, 
I ate Suzie's pussy and Debbie was sitting on my dick. 
RE: Do you always have a threesome? 
ET: Ya. Well most, a lot of times just Suzie. I like just Suzie 
the best. 
RE: Why? 
ET: Cause I love her. 
ES: Do you tell her that? 
ET: Every fucking day and night. 
ES: What does she say? 
ET: She didn't seem to say nothing? 
ES: Did she laugh at you? 
ET: I don't know what she did. She just.... 
ES: Did she laugh at you? 
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RE: What did she say tonight or today that made you angry enough 
to shoot her? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: What did she do to make you angered, that angered you? 
ET: I don't know, I have no idea, just 
ES: What made you have sexual relations with her sister after you 
shot her? 
ET: I don't know what that was. I guess I was just horny, I don't 
know. 
RE: Shooting those people get you excited? 
ET: No. 
RE: Did you have an erection after you shot them? 
ET: No. 
ES: When did you get the erection? 
ET: When I was eating Suzie out, I mean Debbie out. 
ES: Did you ever have a sexual relationship prior to police 
officer finding you? 
ET: Huh? 
ES: Did you have sex with her anymore prior to the police catching 
you? After you left your trailer? 
ET: No. 
ES: Where did you go? 
ET: We went to score some dope. 
RE: Who was driving? 
ET: Debbie. 
ES: What vehicle? 
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ET: Chuck's truck, I mean Chuck's car. 
RE: What kind of car is it? 
ET: I don't know, it's an Oldsmobile I think or something like 
that. 
RE: Is them the clothes you was wearing last night? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: And the same clothes you had on after you had sex with Debbie? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What were you wearing when you shot Suzie? 
ET: These clothes here. 
ES: So you were fully dressed? 
ET: Ya, except for this jacket here. This jacket here we, I mean, 
we picked it off, I mean it was on, all I had to do was, a 
jacket, two jackets, I picked this one here. 
RE: Why did you pick that one? 
ET: She got the other one, Debbie got the other one. 
RE: Why didn't you grab your jacket? Why did you grab Debbie's? 
I mean Suzie's. 
ET: ... inaudible... 
RE: Okay. 
ES: Did you get any dope? You said no right? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Where all did you go? 
ET: I don't know. ...inaudible... 
ES: How many places did you go? 
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ET: We just kept driving around and looking for the dope, I mean 
calling places. I couldn't get the phone numbers. 
ES: What was Debbie saying? 
ET: Huh? 
ES: What was Debbie saying? 
ET: Saying? 
ES: What did she say? How did you guys decide to go ahead and go? 


















She asked you to call medical? 
No, no. 
She asked you to call for help? 
No. 
Was Scotty still sitting there, laying there moaning? 
Ya. 
Was he moaning when you left? 
I think so. 
Which door did you go out of? 
That door. 
Did you leave it unlocked or did you lock it? 
I locked it I think. 
How does it lock? 
Just push the button in. 
Was the front door already locked? 
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RE: What did Debbie say to you while you was riding around? 
ET: Well she said that we could go back and get it on and.... 
RE: And what else? 
ET: I donft know just. 
RE: Edgar? 
ET: Huh? 
RE: I think it's time you start telling us the truth. 
ET: That's the truth. 
ES: Edgar? 
ET: What. 
ES: We think it's time you start telling us the truth. The whole 
truth. I think what you're saying is, is close, but I think 
there's some other things that you know that you're just not 
telling us. 
RE: I think you're fantasizing about a few things here and what 
we'd like you to do is tell us exactly what happened. 
Truthfully. 
ET: That's what happened. 
RE: Why did you shoot Suzie? 
ET: I loved her. 
RE: What happened that you got so angered that you went into the 
back bedroom, got a gun, walked up to the foot of the couch, 
pulled the weapon up to your eye, took aim and shot her in the 
head? 
ET: I didn't shoot her, I mean, I pulled it down like that, I just 
. . . 
RE: Show me again. 
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ET: Like that. 
RE: Stand up and show me, I can't.... 
ES: Stand up. Okay, I'm on the couch. Which hand did you have 
the gun that you shot Suzie with? 
ET: This one here. 
ES: That's your left hand, you had the .22? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: How many times did you squeeze the trigger? 
ET: Once. 
ES: What could you see? 
ET: I wasn't sure. 
RE: Is the .22 an automatic or a revolver? 
ET: An automatic. 
ES: ...inaudible.... 
ET: Huh? 
ES: ... inaudible...is that from the stroke? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Edgar, why did you shoot Suzie. If you loved her, you 
wouldn't have shot her. You've know her for ten years. 
You've talked to her before, you've been able to talk problems 
out before. What problem manifested itself tonight or today 
or last night that gave you the impulse to kill her? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Something had to turn you, what turned you? 
ES: You say you were talking to her when you walked up and at the 
bottom of the couch. What was she saying to you? 
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ET: She was telling me I was disgusting. 
RE: Why? 
ET: I don't know. 
ES: Now tell us. 
RE: I'm going to talk to Debbie and Debbie's going to tell us her 
side of the story, so I want you to tell ya, tell us your side 
before we talk to her. 
ET: That is my side of the story. 
RE; Did you get that sexually aroused by killing those people that 
you.... 
ET: No. 
ES: Then why after killing the woman you love, do you have 
intercourse with her sister? 
ET: Cause I liked Debbie second. I love all women. 
RE: Edgar, start telling the truth. There's something that 
snapped in that trailer house, last night or early this 
morning that made you kill Suzie. 
ET: I don't know what happened. 
RE: It wasn't the devil. You didn't hear voices. What happened? 
ET: I don't know. 
ES: When she said that you were disgusting, when did she say that? 
ET: She said, she said I was disgusting. 
ES: What was happening before that? She sat on the couch and 
yelled down the hall? Is that disgusting? 
ET: No, she was laying there. She called me ...inaudible... 
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ES: Is that a nickname? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What did she say? 
ET: She said you were disgusting. 
ES: What had you done? 
ET; Nothing. 
ES: Was this when you had the guns in your hand or before? 
ET: I had the guns in my hand. 
ES: Okay, something had to have happened as you walked down the 
hall with two guns in your hand. Not one gun, two guns. 
Something had to got happened for you to come from your 
bedroom down the hall, two guns in your hand, point the gun at 
Debbie, at Suzie and take a shot. 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: After you shot Suzie, did you do anything else to her? 
ET: No, I covered her up. 
RE: With the blanket? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What was she wearing? 
ET: I donft know. 
RE: Did she have any blankets on her? 
ET: I think so, I don't know. 
RE: Or did you just cover her head up? 
ET: Her whole, her whole body. 
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ET: No, she was, she had covers down to her, down around here. 
RE: Down to her waist? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Did she have her bra on? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Did she have clothing that covered her? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Did she sit up when you shot her? 
ET: No. 
RE: She was laying down? 
ES: Edgar, did you ask her to come in the hall before you shot 
her? 
ET: No. 
ES: Had you asked her to come and sleep with you earlier? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What did she say? 
ET: Just telling me I was disgusting. 
ES: How did this conversation begin. They're doing heroin, Debbie 
and Suzie are doing heroin, where are they doing their heroin? 
ET: Ah, sometimes my bathroom other times.... 
ES: Where were they doing it this time? 
ET: I think they was using the bathroom over there because I, 
seven, seven fifteen, fourth north and 74 0 East, Apartment C. 
ES: They were doing heroin before they got to your house? 
RE: Who with? 
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ET: I don't know. 
RE: With him? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Is Debbie a prostitute, too? 
ET: I think so. 



















Ya, I guess so. 
Well no, is it true or not? 
I thinks it is. 




Why did you shoot them? 
I don't know. 
Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then? 
I don't know. I just, I don't know. 
Have we made any threats to you during this interview? 
No. 
Have we promised you anything? 
No. 
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RE: Is there anything else that you can tell us in your defense? 
Is there anything that you want to tell us to help us? 
ET: I don't want to make any appeals and I want to be put to death 
by lethal injection. 
RE: You know you're going to be charged with a capital homicide? 
ET: I know. 
RE: Why did you do it? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Are you under any influence of any other drugs or alcohol? 
ET: Just toluene. 
RE: How do you feel? 
ET: Lousy. 
RE: Okay, do you understand everything I've said? 
ET: Sometimes. 
RE: You've made a response to everything I've asked you, is that 
correct? 
ET: I think so. 
RE: Do you have anything else to say? 
ET: I'll think of something in a while. 
RE: Okay, we're going to conclude this interview, same date at 
3:00 PM. 
